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Vorwort 
Die beiden Aufsätze dieses Bandes betonen verschiedene Aspekte von Diver-
sität, die durch die zentralen Konzepte „Europa und Europäisierung“ der lau-
fenden forost-Projektphase angestoßen wurden. Belegt wird, dass Diversität 
sowohl Chancen als auch Risiken für eine Gesellschaft in sich bergen. Frensch 
und Gaucaite-Wittich zeigen den Nutzen von Diversität in Gestalt einer 
höheren Vielfalt von Produkten, die sich – verfügbar gemacht durch Handel – 
in höherem volkswirtschaftlichem Wachstum niederschlägt. Dagegen 
demonstriert Dietz, dass Diversität in Migrationsmustern auf Seite der auf-
nehmenden EU Länder nicht nur positive Aspekte besitzt, sondern auch Ge-
fahren in sich birgt. Das wiederum impliziert die Notwendigkeit konzertierter 
Aktion mit dem Ziel der Formulierung einer gemeinsamen Migrationspolitik in 
der Europäischen Union, um vom Zustrom der Menschen auch tatsächlich zu 
profitieren. 
Der Aufsatz von Barbara Dietz widmet sich den neuen migrationspolitischen 
Herausforderungen an den Grenzen der erweiterten Europäischen Union im 
Osten. Hier konzentriert sich der Blick auf die Migrationsbeziehungen zwi-
schen der Ukraine und der Europäischen Union, deren Dimensionen, Ziele und 
Ursachen untersucht werden. Die Studie zeigt eine zunehmende regionale 
Diversität dieser Wanderungsbewegungen seit dem Ende der neunziger Jahre. 
Während die starken Unterschiede des Lebensstandards und die wachsende 
Arbeitslosigkeit in der Ukraine die Wanderungen in die Europäische Union 
anstoßen, sind im Falle Deutschlands, Polens, Ungarns, der Tschechischen 
Republik und der Slowakei auch traditionelle Netzwerkbeziehungen dafür 
verantwortlich. Hingegen zeigen sich in anderen EU-Ländern wie z.B. Portu-
gal, Spanien, Italien und Griechenland bemerkenswerte Migrationsströme aus 
der Ukraine, ohne dass es vorher besondere Beziehungen weder auf ökonomi-
schem oder politischem Gebiet noch aufgrund von Migrationsbeziehungen in 
der Vergangenheit gab. In diesen Fällen war die Nachfrage nach geringquali-
fizierten, oft saisonalen Arbeitskräften ausschlaggebend für die Wande-
rungsbewegungen. Obwohl ein großer Teil dieser neuen Migrationen temporär 
und zirkulär sein dürfte, sehen sich die Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen 
Union einem wachsenden Immigrationsdruck aus der Ukraine gegenüber. Vor 
diesem Hintergrund ist es das Ziel der Europäischen Union eine gemeinsame 
Migrationspolitik zu entwickeln um den wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Nutzen 
dieser neuen Wanderungen zu realisieren. 
Der Aufsatz von Richard Frensch beschäftigt sich mit der direkten Messung 
technologischer Zustände mit Hilfe von handelsbasierten Maßen der Produkt-
vielfalt. Zählmaße der Vielfalt von Kapitalgütern verhalten sich – unter Be-
rücksichtigung von Produktdifferenzierung nach Herkunftsland – tatsächlich 
wie Technologiemaße, wenn Änderung von Technologie als ein Lernprozess 
aufgefasst wird. Dies trifft hingegen nicht auf Zählmaße der Vielfalt von Vor- 
und Zwischenprodukten zu. Auf der Basis dieser Ergebnisse, die auf Panel-
daten für OECD und Transformationsländern basieren, lässt sich konstatieren, 
dass es im Untersuchungszeitraum tatsächlich zu einer bedingten technologis-
chen Konvergenz gekommen ist. Lässt man auch Einflüsse von Trans-
formationsreformen auf die technologische Konvergenzgeschwindigkeit zu, so 
findet sich ein signifikanter, positiver Einfluss der Transformationsreformen im 
Finanz- und Bankenwesen auf die geschätzte technologische Konvergenz-
geschwindigkeit. 
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Preface 
The two papers in this volume stress different aspects of diversity, made 
possible by “Europe and Europeiasation,” the central concepts of this forost 
project phase. The papers constitute evidence on that diversity incurs both 
benefits and risks for a society. Frensch and Gaucaite-Wittich stress the 
benefits of diversity, in as much as an increasing variety of products, 
available in an economy by way of trade, will result in higher growth. Dietz, 
however, demonstrates that the diversity of migration patterns may well be 
perceived as risk and chance on the receiving side, implying concerted action 
aiming at common migration regulations to benefit from the inflow of people. 
The first paper tackles the issue of direct measurement of the state of 
technology by trade-based measures of product variety. A trade-based count 
measure of the variety of available capital goods, defined over an expanded 
product space allowing for product differentiation by country of origin, is 
indeed found to behave “as if” it represented technology when change of 
technology is understood as a learning process. Variety measures of available 
primary and intermediate inputs do not behave this way. Based on available 
capital goods variety estimations, there is conditional technological 
convergence among a panel of mostly OECD and transition countries. 
Extending the analysis to allow for transitional reforms to influence 
technological convergence shows that banking reforms exert a positive and 
significant effect on the speed of technological convergence. 
In focussing on the migration policy challenges at the new Eastern borders of 
the enlarged European Union, the second paper of this report analyses the 
determinants, patterns and dimensions of recent migrations between the 
Ukraine and European Union member states. Concerning the choice of 
destination regions, the study reveals an increasing regional diversity in the 
movements between the Ukraine and European Union countries since the end 
of the 1990ies. Whereas high income differences and a lack of job 
opportunities in the sending country trigger these movements in general, 
they are additionally based on traditional migration patterns and network 
relations in states such as Germany, Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the 
Slovak Republic. In other countries, such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and 
Greece, labour migrations from the Ukraine have developed in the absence of 
networks, cultural and political ties. In these cases, the demand for low-
skilled labour in segmented markets, particularly in the nontraded goods 
sectors of the economy seems to have supported the movement of Ukrainian 
labour migrants. Although a considerable part of these movements are 
expected to be temporary or circular, European Union countries face a 
potentially substantial labour migration from the Ukraine, further diversifying 
their immigrant populations. As the number of Ukrainian citizens willing to 
enter the European Union will almost certainly exceed the legal opportunities 
currently in force, illegal migrations are likely to occur. Although the European 
Union has undertaken some efforts to develop common migration regulations, 
many of the proposed policy measurements are still indeterminate, 
particularly in the case of low-skilled labour movements. 
Bamberg, Nürnberg und Regensburg im November 2007 
Friedrich Heckmann und Joachim Möller 
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Migration policy challenges at the new Eastern 
borders of the enlarged European Union: The 
Ukrainian case 
Barbara Dietz 
Abstract∗ 
With the enlargement of the European Union, new bordering countries 
emerged in the East which are characterized by comparatively low 
incomes and living standards, incomplete democratization and a number 
of latent political conflicts. Against this background it can be expected that 
migrations from these countries into the European Union will be growing, 
although a considerable part of the expected movements might be 
temporary or circular. Focussing on the Ukraine which shares borders with 
four European Union countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania) and 
which entertains migration relations with a number of European Union 
member states, this study identifies the new migration challenges at the 
Eastern borders of the enlarged European Union. The study reveals, that 
some European Union states are particularly addressed by Ukrainian 
labour migrations. Whereas high income differences and a lack of job 
opportunities in the home country trigger these movements in general, 
they are additionally based on traditional migration patterns and network 
relations in states such as Germany, Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the 
Slovak Republic. In other EU member states, such as Portugal, Spain, Italy 
and Greece, the demand for low-skilled labour in segmented markets, 
particularly in the nontraded goods sectors of the economy seems to have 
primarily supported the movement of Ukrainian labour migrants. Although 
the European Union has recently undertaken some efforts to develop 
common migration regulations, many of the proposed policy 
measurements are still indeterminate, particularly in the case of low-
skilled labour movements. 
1 Introduction 
The European Union is one of the most attractive parts in the world to 
migrate to, although some European Union member states have tried to 
reduce and control immigration as much as possible. This situation has 
been reinforced by the enlargement of the European Union which resulted 
in new migration challenges at its Eastern borders, facing Russia, the 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. As in the case of many migrant sending 
states, the new East European neighbour countries of the European Union 
are characterized by comparatively low incomes and living standards, 
                                                 
∗  Colleagues in Munich, from UNICEF, Florence and from the EU INTAS project ‘Patterns of Mi-
gration in the New European Borderlands’ provided helpful comments. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges financial assistance from the  Bavarian State Ministry of Science, Research and the 
Arts,  forost (Forschungsverbund Ost- und Südosteuropa) grant 
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incomplete democratization and a number of latent political conflicts. 
Against this background it can be expected that migrations from these 
countries into the European Union will be growing, although a considerable 
part of the expected movements might be temporary or circular, meaning 
a repeated back and forth migration between sending and receiving 
countries. Presumably migrations in search for labour will dominate East-
West movements, although ethnic return migrations, asylum and transit 
movements will also play a role. As the number of people willing to enter 
the European Union countries will certainly exceed the legal opportunities, 
illegal migrations are likely to occur. 
Past experience shows that not all member countries of the European 
Union are confronted with a similar migration pressure from outside. 
Nevertheless, the free movement of people within the territory of the 
European Union led to the dependence of each member state on the 
immigration practice and policy of other European Union states. This 
situation calls for a unified and comprehensive European Union migration 
policy – a policy which has already been partly realized in the field of 
asylum regulations and border control and which is currently discussed in 
the field of labour migration. 
This study identifies the new migration challenges at the Eastern borders 
of the enlarged European Union – focusing on the Ukraine which shares 
borders with four European Union countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Romania) and which entertains migration relations with a number of 
European Union member states. In the second part of the study it will be 
examined, how migration movements have developed since the Ukraine 
became independent in 1991. Against the background of theoretical 
considerations, migration motivations and the most important countries of 
destination will be portrayed. The third part reviews the discourse on the 
risks and chances of migrations in the European Union and the sending 
region Ukraine to identify economic and political concerns with respect to 
recent and potential movements. In a fourth part, the paper examines 
European Union migration policies currently in force and it surveys the 
discussion on future European Union migration policy options towards the 
new neighbouring countries in the East of its borders. The final part 
summarizes and concludes. 
2 The Ukrainian migration experience: 
determinants, facts and figures 
Since its independence in 1991 the Ukraine participated in international 
migrations which appeared as a result of the economic and political trans-
formations of the country and of the fundamental geopolitical changes 
following the break up of the Soviet Union (Frejka et al. 1999, Tishkov et 
al. 2005). Although the area of today’s Ukraine has been involved in 
numerous migration movements in its history, as for example the high 
emigrations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries1, followed by 
resettlements, forced migrations and labour movements in the Soviet 
                                                 
1 In that time emigrants left for the United States, Argentina, Brazil and Canada as well as for 
Siberia and Central Asia. 
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period, migration after independence was unique. In a comparatively short 
period, the Ukraine experienced considerable immigrations and 
emigrations because of ethnic reasons as well as refugee, transit and 
economic migrations. 
2.1 Determinants of migration: theoretical considerations 
In many studies, international migrations are nearly exclusively related to 
economic factors, such as income differentials and employment 
opportunities. This is rooted in the neoclassical theory of labour migration 
which emphasizes the responsibility of wage differences between different 
countries or regions for the movement of people. Given free mobility, 
workers move from countries with lower wages to those with 
comparatively higher wages (Bauer and Zimmermann 1998). In the 
framework of this model, where full employment, no migration costs and 
no insecurity exist and all individuals behave rationally, the larger the 
wage gap between sending and receiving areas, the more people will 
move. If wages increase in the sending area, migration will decrease, 
whereas a wage increase in the receiving country will lead to the opposite 
effect. In formulating a more realistic model, further theoretical work in 
the framework of neoclassics allowed unemployment in sending and 
receiving areas to exist. In this case, labour migration depends on the 
expected and not the absolute real wage differentials, thus taking the 
chance to find a job into account (Harris and Todaro 1970). 
Modelling the migration decision in a micro context, human capital theory 
argues in the framework of neoclassics, but from a strictly individual point 
of view. This concept focuses on individual decision-making and highlights 
the importance of human capital characteristics in the migration process 
(Sjaastad 1962). According to human capital theory, people move if the 
expected returns to individual human capital - reduced by migration costs 
- are bigger in the immigration than in the home country. Incorporating 
migration costs which include the costs for travelling, information and 
income losses, as well as the psychological costs of leaving family, friends 
and the home country environment, obviously improves the explaining 
power of the model. If individual migration decisions are seen in 
dependence of human capital characteristics, sociodemographic factors 
influence the movement of people. In this framework, the demographic 
structure of sending countries is an important determinant for migration 
movements. As young people with a comparatively long working career 
ahead of them profit most from migrations, it can be expected that 
movements are stronger the younger the age structure of the sending 
countries is. This is reflected by many past and contemporary (labour) 
migration flows, which mostly consist of people in the beginning of their 
working career. 
Apparently migration is a risky task, a fact that individual cost benefit 
approaches allow introducing. Dependent on individual risk aversion 
people decide to move in comparing a secure income at home with the 
expected value of earning abroad, discounted by risk aversion. Similar to 
risk aversion, expectations on future home country developments operate. 
In this context, the option value of waiting is a key argument, suggesting 
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that potential migrants have an incentive to wait, if they are not sure 
migration pays off (Burda 1995). Thus, migration decisions may become 
obsolete in the longer run; given economic conditions improve in the home 
countries. The high relevance of expectations in the context of migration 
decisions has been emphasized by a recent World Bank report which found 
decreasing migration trends in sending countries if people think that the 
quality of life there will improve (Mansoor and Quillin 2006: 13). 
Rejecting a purely individual point of view and the dominance of wage 
differential in explaining the movement of people, the new economics of 
labour migration argue that households are the relevant decision making 
unit and that the failure of capital, credit and insurance markets are 
primarily responsible for migration movements (Stark 1991). In the case 
of developing countries rural households can only survive under market 
conditions if they make capital investments and insure their production 
against risks. Likewise, workers in poor countries and in a number of 
transition economies are not (fully) protected by governments from 
unemployment risks and old age pensions are not guaranteed. In the 
absence of insurance systems and functioning capital as well as credit 
markets, family members are sent abroad to earn money for capital-
building and risk insurance. Consequently, the migration decision of 
households can be interpreted as a portfolio strategy to diversify family 
incomes. In a further argument, the new economics of migration identifies 
relative deprivation to determine migration movements. If households 
earn a low income compared to their home country reference group, they 
tend to send family members abroad to relatively improve their income 
position. 
Whereas most economic theories refer to the labour supply side in the 
migration process, some economists point to the demand for labour in 
segmented labour markets as the initial incentive for international 
movements (Piore 1979). In advanced industrial societies labour market 
segmentation is characterized by a primary labour market with secure 
employment conditions, comparatively high wages and social security 
standards, and a secondary labour market with a highly variable demand, 
low wages, little security and difficult working conditions. Because native 
workers are drawn into the primary sector of the economy and in many 
cases are not willing to accept secondary labour market jobs, immigrant 
labour is recruited. Under these conditions a growing demand for workers 
in the secondary labour market presumably leads to an increase in 
immigration, since enterprises are not willing to pay higher wages and 
improve labour conditions in secondary markets as a precondition to 
attract native workers. Particularly nontraded goods sectors – that can not 
be outsourced and do not require a high skill level – can be expected to be 
characterized by segmentation and the demand for low skilled 
immigration. 
In some cases, demand-driven labour migrations have been supported by 
governmental recruitment programs or bilateral contracts. An example is 
the labour movement from Southern European countries to Germany in 
the 1960s and 1970s which had been initiated by the so-called guest 
worker policy. Since the early 1990s, Germany and some other European 
Union countries again established recruitment schemes for short-term 
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labour by concluding bilateral agreements with East European and former 
Soviet Union states. 
To understand the dynamics of international migrations, network theory 
has argued that across time and space migrant networks develop which 
stabilize and potentially increase population movements. In this context 
migration networks are defined as connections between migrants and non 
migrants in countries of destination and origin through ties of kinship, 
friendship, and shared community or ethnic origin. Because networks 
reduce the costs and risk of movements, they are expected to increase the 
likelihood of further migrations (Massey et al. 1998: 42). The development 
of migration networks influence the individual migration decision in such a 
way that the greater the number of migrants a person back home in the 
sending area knows, the greater the probability that this person will also 
migrate. 
Although economic factors and supporting network relations have been 
proven to be key determinants in explaining international migrations 
(Mayda 2005), they have shortcomings. In a number of cases these are 
related to the fact that migration theories argue in the context of a world 
without migration barriers. In reality, however, migration policies and 
institutional barriers play a decisive role in channelling international 
movements (Hatton and Williamson 2002). Consequently state policy has 
to be introduced into migration models to capture the effects of legal 
migration regulations (Hollifield 2000). A further conceptual extension is 
needed in the case of refugee and (ethnic) return movements, which are 
closely related to political and ethno-national migration motivations, 
although economic hardship may play a role as well. Because of (civil) 
wars, political instabilities, national conflicts and ethnic discriminations in 
sending areas people are driven out, while asylum laws, citizenship 
regulations and the ethnic affinity of returning migrants towards receiving 
states act as pull factors. These migration determinants are best modelled 
in the framework of considerations which reflect historical, ethno-national 
and political preconditions in sending and receiving countries. 
Although the theories described above focus on different levels of analysis 
and built on different assumptions and scientific disciplines, they are not 
mutually exclusive. To explore the complex determinants of empirical 
migration movements it is reasonable to draw on a combination of 
theoretical argumentations in identifying the economic, social and legal 
aspects that drive international movements. 
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2.2 Migration in the Ukraine: empirical evidence 
In the two years following independence, the Ukraine experienced a high 
positive net migration which slowed down significantly in 1993 and turned 
negative between 1994 and 2004. In the year 2005 – after eleven years of 
out migration – a small migration surplus was achieved (see figure 1).2 
Immigration into the Ukraine reached its peak in the year 1992 when 
more than half a million persons entered, most of them coming from the 
successor states of the USSR (Malynovska 2006). In subsequent years the 
number of immigrants decreased continuously, achieving its so far lowest 
figure (38 500) in 2004. As in the case of immigration, emigration was 
highest in the beginning of the nineties. With nearly 346 000 persons 
leaving, emigration mounted in 1994, slowing down year by year 
afterwards. Overall the Ukraine lost 246 000 people as a result of officially 
registered migration movements between 1991 and 2005 (TransMONEE 
2006). 
Figure 1: Immigration, emigration and net migration in the Ukraine (1991-
2005) 
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Sources:  TransMONEE 2006 database, State Statistics Committee of 
Ukraine 
In the nineties a considerable number of border crossings occurred 
between the Ukraine and (neighbouring) states with no visa regime such 
as Poland and Hungary which were not reflected by migration statistics. 
These movements consisted of short-term, circular trips undertaken by 
                                                 
2  The data presented here refer to the TransMONEE 2006 data base. In a number of years 
(1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001) the TransMONEE data differ 
from official Ukrainian migration statistics, presumably because of a different definition of 
immigrants with respect to citizenship categories. As negative net migration data delivered by 
the Ukrainian statistical office are higher in the respective years than those of TransMONEE it 
is suspected that a considerable number of ethnic Ukrainians who returned to the Ukraine 
from the former Soviet Union had not been counted as immigrants by the State Statistics 
Committee of Ukraine. 
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people engaged in petty-trade (shuttle trade). On both sides of the 
border, Ukrainian citizens bought and sold goods to profit from price and 
exchange rate differences. According to opinion polls conducted in the 
middle of the 1990ies regular trips abroad to improve income and living 
standard had become a key business activity for approximately 5% of the 
economically active population in the Ukraine while 20% of the working-
age population attempted these trips occasionally (Frejka et al. 1999: 6). 
After independence immigrations into and emigrations from the Ukraine 
were characterized by the dominance of exchange movements with former 
Soviet Union states, first of all Russia. Between 1991 and 2004, over 90% 
of all immigrants into the Ukraine came from post Soviet countries, 
whereas 75% of all emigrants left for the successor states of the USSR 
(Malynovska 2006). Although overall officially registered emigration 
declined since 1994, the share of people leaving for the West increased 
from 20% in the beginning of the nineties to 33% in 2004, confirming the 
growing weight of Western, primarily European Union states as destination 
for migrants, leaving the Ukraine (Malynovska 2006). 
Based on the data presented above, emigrations from the Ukraine 
followed a decreasing trend since the middle of the nineties which 
contradicts the empirical observation that Russia as well as a number 
European Union countries faced an increasing immigration from the 
Ukraine in that period (see table 4). This inconsistency is due to the fact 
that only persons who receive an official permission to reside abroad are 
registered by Ukrainian officials as emigrants. Ukrainian citizens, who 
leave the Ukraine on the base of a tourist visa, participate in bilateral 
agreements for short-term work or in a student exchange program are not 
counted in official emigration statistics. Besides, illegal border crossings 
add to an increased number of Ukrainians, living and working abroad.3 
What were the basic determinants which drove migration movements in 
the Ukraine since its independence? Referring to the theoretical 
argumentations introduced earlier it will be argued that a combination of 
ethnic and economic motivations as well as of social and legal factors were 
responsible for migrations in the Ukraine, although the weight of the 
respective causes changed over time. Whereas ethnic and political 
migration motivations had been prevalent in the beginning of the 
migration exchange with post Soviet states, economic determinants 
increasingly won in importance since the end of the nineties. This reflects 
the dominance of ethnic return movements after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union when national minorities had an opportunity to return to 
their newly founded nation states. A similar pattern was observed with 
respect to migrations into Western countries. While a decreasing number 
of emigrants left the Ukraine because of ethnic, religious and political 
motives, the number of people that entered Western countries in search 
for (short-term) work grew. 
                                                 
3  The weak and often inconsistent data base is a general problem in documenting international 
migration. This study addresses the dilemma by using various statistical sources on migrants’ 
stocks and flows, by referring to estimations in the case of illegal migrations and by taking 
survey studies into account. 
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Consistent with economic migration theory high differences in income 
between the Ukraine and Russia as well as between the Ukraine and 
Western states exist, which are expected to exhibit a strong migration 
incentive (see table 1). In 2005, for instance, the GDP per head in the 
Ukraine amounted to 32% of that in Russia and to 15% of that in the 
Czech Republic, providing a solid migration motivation since the middle of 
the 1990ies. 
A look at real GDP growth rates in the Ukraine indicates an improvement 
of the economic situation since the turn of the century, although the 
Ukrainian economy has still not reached its size prior to transition. As in 
the case of developing countries where dynamic growing economies are 
consistent with high emigrations (Massey 2005) it is assumed that 
emigration pressure in the Ukraine will not be promptly reduced in the 
presence of GDP growth. This is related to the economic transformation 
from a planned to a market economy where the radical change of social 
structures encourages growth but creates a mobile population in search 
for employment opportunities. 
A recent World Bank report found the labour market in the Ukraine in an 
early stage of transition, indicating that labour reallocation which will 
result in an increase in unemployment still lies ahead. While 
unemployment rates in the Ukraine are not remarkable in a transition 
country comparison (9% in 2003 according to ILO standards), a low labour 
participation rate points to job scarcity. Less than 60% of the Ukrainian 
working age population was employed in 2003 that is below the OECD 
average of 65% (World Bank 2005). In recent years, many workers had 
been discouraged by the poor job opportunities in the Ukraine and have 
withdrawn from the officially registered labour force. Besides working in 
the shadow economy, (short-term) migration is an option to obtain gainful 
employment.4 
Table 1:  GPD per capita (PPP, in US $), various European countries, Russia and 
Ukraine 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Germany 21 855 22 622 23 418 24 230 25 481 26 405 26 858 27 196 28 303 
Italy 21 802 22 455 23 111 23 721 24 994 26 016 26 577 27 150 28 180 
Spain 17 847 18 726 19 674 20 610 21 764 22 902 23 417 24 152 25 046 
Greece 14 106 14 768 15 365 16 268 17 391 18 632 19 588 20 841 22 204 
Portugal 14 696 15 575 16 416 17 220 18 255 18 933 18 974 18 932 19 628 
Czech Rep. 13 745 13 919 13 981 14 442 15 373 16 428 17 211 18 064 19 408 
Hungary 9 958 10 801 11 544 12 220 13 223 13 900 14 710 15 451 16 814 
Slovakia 9 279 9 887 10 418 10 799 11 303 12 005 12 817 13 426 14 622 
Poland 8 050 8 737 9 251 9 763 10 401 10 855 11 219 11 965 12 974 
Russia 5 795 6 038 5 932 6 401 7 095 7 561 8 130 9 036 9 902 
Ukraine 3 628 3 610 3 640 3 748 4 108 4 581 4 903 5 524 6 394 
                                                 
4  The shadow economy in the Ukraine was estimated by the World Bank to reach 54% of GDP 
in 2003. 
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Source: United Nations Database 
Figure 2: Real GDP growth, annual change in GDP, Ukraine 
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Source: Transmonee Database 
Approaching the migration decision from an individual perspective, survey 
studies revealed income differences and a lack of job opportunities as the 
two most important reasons for Ukrainians to emigrate. In a study 
conducted by the IOM in 1998, more than half of respondents (58%) 
named wages as motivation to migrate and 37% referred to good 
employment chances abroad (IOM 1998: 25). A very similar result was 
attained by a research, the IOM organized in 2006 in Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine (GfK 2006). The number one reason for 
working abroad was low income at home, given by 81% of respondents, 
whereas a lack of job opportunities in the country was identified second, 
by 60.8% of respondents (GfK 2006: 27). Furthermore, the new 
economics of migration which identify the insufficiency of markets for 
insurance, capital and credit as root causes for migration seem to be 
relevant in the Ukrainian context as well. Insurance markets are not 
functioning appropriately in the Ukraine and access to credits is very 
limited for average families (Institute for Economic Research and Policy 
Consulting 2004). This makes it attractive for people that for example plan 
to finance home ownership, to overcome the deficiencies of the credit 
market at home by earning an additional income abroad. 
While economic arguments point to a considerable emigration pressure in 
the Ukraine, which in general is not constrained by Ukrainian laws, 
emigration movements are severely restricted by legal measures on the 
part of most receiving countries. Particularly in the context of migrations 
from the Ukraine into the European Union, restraining migration policies 
control the inflow of authorized (labour) movements, for example in the 
context of bilateral contracts on labour migrations. Nevertheless, labour 
migrants from the Ukraine can be expected to enter or work illegally in 
economically better off countries, as long as basic migration incentives 
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persist. In this context human smuggling plays a decisive role in fostering 
movements into states that close their borders towards immigrants. 
Furthermore, human trafficking - where criminal networks transport men, 
women and children across borders for the purpose of sexual exploitation 
and forced labour – is a serious problem in comparatively poor countries 
with a high migration pressure. A recent U.S. Department of State report 
and an IOM study found the Ukraine the most important source country of 
human trafficking in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (U.S. Department of 
State 2006, GfK 2006). 
2.2.1 The migration exchange with the successor states 
of the Soviet Union 
The first two years after the break up of the Soviet Union were 
characterized by a high migration exchange between the successor states 
of the USSR, now being independent nations. This was particularly true for 
the Ukraine which received 984 000 immigrants from various parts of the 
former Soviet Union in 1991 and 1992 (Malynovska 2006). Most of these 
immigrants belonged to the group of ethnic Ukrainians (repatriates) who 
returned from Russia, Kazakhstan or Belarus. Furthermore Crimean Tatars 
resettled in large numbers in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, their 
traditional homeland. A remarkable part of these movements was related 
to (forced) migrations in earlier periods of the Soviet era. In the 1930-50s, 
Ukrainians and other ethnic minorities (Crimean Tatars, Germans and 
Poles) living in the Ukraine had been subject to deportation and (forced) 
resettlement. They were sent to Northern and Eastern parts of Russia, to 
Kazakhstan and other regions of the Soviet Union. In later years the 
Soviet regime actively supported labour migrations which aimed at a 
population exchange within Union Republics. While the Ukraine was a net 
immigration republic throughout the Soviet era, ethnic Ukrainians were 
the most important group to leave while ethnic Russians were the biggest 
group to enter. In 1989, at the time of the last Soviet census there were 
6.8 million Ukrainians living in the Soviet Union outside the Ukraine, 
predominantly in Russia (4.4 million) and Kazakhstan (890 000), whereas 
nearly half (44%) of those 11 million Russians who inhabited the Ukraine 
in 1989 had not been born there (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine). 
In addition to groups, moving to the independent Ukraine because of 
ethnic and homeland reasons, a number of immigrants looked for refuge, 
having escaped ethnic tension, civil war and political conflicts in their post 
Soviet home countries. Among these populations were people from 
Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan who sought protection in the 
Ukraine which had passed a law on refugees in 1993, based on the 1951 
Geneva Convention (Malynovska 2006). In the course of the 1990s the 
Ukraine became the address of refugee groups from outside the former 
Soviet Union as well, which came from regions hit by (civil) wars and 
economic crisis such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, African countries 
and the Middle East (IOM 1996: 135, Kraler and Iglicka 2002: 40, Mansoor 
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and Quillin 2006: 42). Some of these asylum seekers found refuge in the 
Ukraine, others moved on to the West.5 
As in the case of immigration, emigration from the Ukraine was 
characterized by ethnic return movements in the early nineties. Ethnic 
Russians, moving to Russia made up the most important part of emigrants 
in this period. However, in the middle of the nineties the motivation for 
leaving the Ukraine towards post Soviet states, primarily Russia, changed. 
Against the background of the economic crisis in the Ukraine, economic 
reasons were increasingly an incentive to move out of the country. In part, 
emigrants left permanently for economically better off post Soviet states, 
mainly Russia. Besides, labour migrants crossed the border primarily 
towards Russia in search for short-term and seasonal work. In addition to 
considerable GDP differences between Russia and the Ukraine (see table 
1), movements were encouraged by a common history in the Soviet 
period, language proficiency and (ethnic) network relations. It is not 
surprising, therefore that an estimated number of one million Ukrainians 
worked in Russia in 2002 (Malynovska 2004: 14). Most of these migrants 
were occupied in semi legal and illegal jobs in construction, agriculture 
and services. 
Between 1991 and 2004, the Ukraine lost 1 897 500 persons who moved 
to post Soviet states, while 2 229 870 entered from the successor states 
of the USSR (Malynovska 2006). Because these movements were primarily 
related to repatriations and ethnic return movements, they affected the 
ethnic composition of the population to a considerable extend (see table 
2). 
Table 2:  Ethnic composition of the population in the Ukraine (in thousands, 
2001, 1989) 
 2001 
in % of the 
population 
2001 
1989 
in % of the 
population 
1989 
Total 48 457 100.0 51 452 100.0 
Ukrainians 37 541 77.8 37 419 72.7 
Russians 8 334 17.3 11 355 22.1 
Crimean Tatars 248 0.5 46 0.0 
Poles 144 0.3 219 0.4 
Jews 103 0.2 486 0.9 
Armenians 94 0.2 54 0.1 
Azerbaijani 45 0.1 36 0.0 
Georgians 34 0.1 23 0.0 
Germans 33 0.1 37 0.1 
Sources: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, Vestnik statistiki, no.10, 
1990 
                                                 
5  Because a readmission treaty has been signed between the Ukraine and the EU in the year 
2006, the Ukraine will be obliged to take back third country nationals (as well as its citizens) 
entering the EU illegally from Ukrainian territory. 
Arbeitspapier Nr. 42 
 
18 
Due to a negative natural population development and an overall net 
emigration between 1989 and 2001 the population of the Ukraine 
decreased by 5.8% in this period. However, because of ethnic return 
migrations, the share of Ukrainians in the total population which had made 
up 72.7% in 1989, increased to 77.8% in the year 2001. In a similar way, 
the return of Crimean Tatars led to an increase of this ethnic minority by 5 
times. 
As census data reveal, population groups from post Soviet states that 
found refuge in the Ukraine enlarged their share such as Armenians, 
Azerbaijani and Georgians, whereas groups that left to their nation states 
lost in importance. The most prominent example is the Russian population 
in the Ukraine which decreased by 26.6% between 1989 and 2001, 
reducing its share in the total population to 17.3% in 2002, while in 1989 
it had made up of 22.1% (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine). 
2.2.2 The migration exchange with Western states 
Migration into Western states is not a new phenomenon for the Ukraine. 
As a part of the Soviet Union, the country has experienced three waves of 
emigration towards the West: After the revolution in 1917, in the course of 
World War II and after the 1960s. Although the constitution of the USSR 
never contained any guarantee of freedom of movement, Soviet legislation 
permitted a very limited number of people to emigrate in the post World 
War II period for the purpose of reuniting families.6 This emigration policy 
was primarily the result of the intervention of foreign states on the part of 
groups wishing to emigrate.7 The main beneficiaries were Jews and 
Germans whose families had been wrenched apart by the events of the 
war and whose potential recipient countries (the USA, Israel and 
Germany) supported their cause. In the case of Jews, anti-Semitism 
forced people to leave, in the case of Germans, ethnic repression and 
forced resettlement in earlier periods were push factors. 
In October 1989, the debate over emigration policy in the Soviet Union 
took a new turn. The Supreme Soviet approved a draft law on its first 
reading which put travel in and out of the country for Soviet citizens on a 
new basis. Most importantly, the draft law accepted reasons for emigration 
other than family reunion and recognized the individual right to travel. 
Consequently, emigration from the Ukraine to Western countries increased 
in 1989, reaching its so far highest number of issued permissions to leave 
in 1990, when 95 000 persons were allowed to depart (Frejka et al. 1999: 
5). In admitting 92% of all emigrants from the Ukraine in 1990, Israel was 
by far the most important receiving country in this year, followed by the 
USA (3%) and Germany (1.5%). 
                                                 
6  This refers to the "regulations on entry to and exit from the USSR" of June 1959. 
These rules of law were reviewed in 1970 and again in 1986, but were not 
fundamentally amended. 
7  In this context the Jackson-Vanik amendment (1973) played a role, impeding trade 
unless Jews were allowed to leave freely. In addition the Soviet government signed 
the Helsinki accord (1975), pledging, among other things, to facilitate freer 
movements of its citizens. 
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Since the break up of the Soviet Union emigrants from the Ukraine to the 
West addressed new destination countries, many belonging to the 
European Union or becoming a part of it after May 2004 (Pribytkova 
2006). In 1994, nearly every fifth emigrant (18%) from the Ukraine to the 
West chose a destination other than Israel, the United States and 
Germany. This development was related to a shift from ethnic to economic 
migration motivations originating in the economic crisis in the Ukraine 
which accompanied the transformation process. A labour movement 
towards the West established, which is reflected by the increase in 
registered labour migrants, rising from 11 800 persons in 1996 to about 
40 000 persons in 2002 (Malynovska 2004). Besides, a high number of 
illegally employed Ukrainians are working in European Union countries. 
According to estimations of Ukrainians embassies about 800 000 Ukrainian 
labour migrants were occupied in various European countries in 2002, a 
considerable number of them illegally (figure 3). 
Figure 3: Estimated numbers of Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland, Italy, the 
Czech Republic and Portugal (2003) 
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Source: Malynowska 2004 
To channel the growing migration pressure and to prevent illegal labour 
movements, a number of European Union states has concluded bilateral 
agreements on temporary labour movements with the Ukraine or has 
established training programs for Ukrainian workers. Some European 
Union states which recently were exposed to (illegal) labour immigration 
from the Ukraine are discussing to introduce such bilateral agreements 
(see table 3). In the perspective of the Ukraine, bilateral agreements on 
labour migration became an increasingly relevant instrument to protect 
the rights of Ukrainian citizens working abroad. 
What were the most important receiving countries in the European Union 
for Ukrainian labour migrants and which factors determined the choice of 
destinations? Although data sources are limited, the inflows of Ukrainian 
immigrants into selected European Union countries compiled by the OECD 
identify those states, which recently attracted Ukrainian (labour) migrants 
(see table 4). With respect to the background of Ukrainian immigration, 
the most important receiving European Union states can be classified into 
two groups, with Germany being a special case. One group consists of new 
East European Union member states, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary which formerly belonged to the Warsaw pact. No 
visa regimes had existed between these states and the Ukraine before 
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2003 (in the case of Slovakia before 2000), thus facilitating border 
crossings, shuttle trade and short-term work. A second group that hosts 
Ukrainian labour migrants includes Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. In 
these countries that transformed recently from emigration into 
immigration regions labour migration from the Ukraine is a new 
phenomenon. Besides, Germany entertains migration relations with the 
Ukraine, primarily in the context of ethnic, family and refugee movements. 
Other European Union member states have not admitted a considerable 
number of Ukrainian (labour) migrants yet, although empirical studies 
point to a growing population of Ukrainians, working (illegally) in the 
United Kingdom and in the Netherlands (Trades Union Congress 2004, 
Shakhno and Pool 2005). 
Table 3:  Bilateral agreements on temporary labour migration between the 
Ukraine and European Union countries 
Country Agreements on temporary labour migration 
Czech Republic  up to 12 month with possible 6 month extension for work permit 
Latvia not specified 
Lithuania not specified 
Germany 12-18 months 
Poland 12-18 months 
Portugal 12 months with possible 24 months extension 
Slovakia not specified 
Belgium in discussion 
Greece in discussion 
Hungary in discussion 
Spain in discussion 
Sources: OECD 2004, Cipko 2006 
The new members of the European Union, for example the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Hungary and Slovakia experienced little immigration in the past. 
However, the encouraging economic development in recent years and the 
accession to the European Union turned them into an attractive 
destination for refugees and labour migrants from poorer and more 
unstable regions in the East (Wallace 2002). Although Ukrainians belong 
to one of the most important new immigrant groups in the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, their immigration patterns differ somewhat 
in a country to country comparison. In the Czech Republic, immigration 
from the Ukraine is characterized by circulating labour and partly by long-
term movements. Married men with a relatively high education, coming 
without their families, dominate the group of Ukrainian labour migrants in 
the Czech Republic. In Poland, Hungary and Slovakia migrants from the 
Ukraine were engaged in petty trade until the middle of the 1990s while in 
later years they performed primarily seasonal or short-term work 
(Drbohlav and Janska 2004). 
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Table 4:  Inflows of Ukrainian citizens into various European Union countries (in 
thousands) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Germany* 13.7 12.5 14.1 15.3 18.2 20.5 20.6 17.7 15.0 
Italy – – 1.0 2.8 4.1 5.1 8.1 – 11.2 
Spain – – 0.2 0.6 6.3 11.0 10.8 9.1 10.3 
Portugal – – – – – 45.2 16.5 2.5 0.7 
Czech Rep. 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.0 2.4 13.0 23.7 15.0 
Hungary 1.4 1.4 1.8 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.6 2.5 
Slovakia – – – – – – – 0.7 0.7 
Poland – – 0.9 2.6 3.4 4.8 6.9 8.4 10.2 
* ethnic German immigrants (Aussiedler) are not included 
– not available 
Source: OECD 2006 
Next to geographic proximity, Ukrainian labour migration into the new 
European Union member states was triggered by income differences and 
job opportunities. In East European Union countries neighbouring the 
Ukraine, a substantial demand for (seasonal) unskilled labour exists which 
can not be satisfied by native workers. In addition, established network 
relations between ethnic minorities on both sides of the border strengthen 
potential movements in reducing costs and risks. In Zakarpathia (Ukraine) 
for example, near to the border of Hungary, approximately 151 000 ethnic 
Hungarians live, whereas the Polish minority in the Ukraine which settles 
near to the Polish border consists of 140 000 people. Ethnic ties to the 
Ukraine prevail on the Polish side as well where 312 000 Polish citizens are 
registered, who have been born in the Ukraine (OECD 2006: 269). 
In the context of global migration movements it is a puzzling question why 
South European Union countries attracted Ukrainian migrants although no 
traditional economic, social or cultural relations exist and a comparatively 
far distance has to be overcome to reach these countries. In a European 
Union comparison, South European Union countries do not display the 
highest wages, which otherwise could be an explanation for the choice of 
this region. Nevertheless, existing income differentials between the 
Ukraine and South European Union countries can be considered high 
enough to make labour migrations pay off (see table 1). In addition, two 
further arguments have to be put forward to explain the new movements 
from the Ukraine into Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. On the one hand, 
a demand for low skilled, flexible labour exists in these countries, primarily 
in construction, agriculture, services and tourism. On the other hand, a 
comparatively inexperienced migration control and regularisation 
procedures attract Ukrainian migrants into these regions.8 
The regularisation of immigrants is a controversially debated issue in 
European Union member states (Heckmann and Wunderlich 2005). While 
                                                 
8 In recent years a number of efforts have been undertaken by Southern European countries to 
enforce immigration control. 
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North and West European Union countries usually oppose the legalization 
of illegals, South European Union states have practiced it frequently. The 
basic contra argument identifies legalization as an incentive to further 
(unwanted) immigrations. However, countries with a high number of 
illegals face a growing economic inequality, a loss of governmental 
incomes, distorted competition and social tensions. Thus, South European 
Union countries with little experience in regulating and controlling 
immigration use legalization procedures in order to manage migration 
after it has occurred. The high number of Ukrainian citizens which 
participated in recent regularisation programs in South European Union 
member states confirms a considerable illegal immigration from the 
Ukraine. In 1998 for example, Greece legalized 9 800 Ukrainians, Italy 
legalized 100 100 immigrants from the Ukraine in 2002 and Portugal 63 
500 in 2001 (OECD 2005: 100). 
Among European Union states that received Ukrainian immigrants in 
recent years, Germany represents a unique case. According to officially 
registered immigrations, between 1996 and 2004 Germany has been the 
most important receiving country for Ukrainian immigrants in the 
European Union (see table 4). This is related to the fact that Germany 
entertains migration relations with the Ukraine that date back to the 
beginning of the 1950ies. Since that period ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) 
return from the (former) Soviet Union to Germany where they are 
admitted on the base of the German constitution (Dietz 2006). They are 
entitled to receive the German citizenship and to obtain governmental 
support for economic and social integration. Although Ukraine is fourth 
behind Russia, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic in sending ethnic 
Germans, approximately 40 000 return migrants of German origin had left 
the Ukraine between 1992 and 2006 to settle in Germany.9 Next to ethnic 
Germans, Jewish immigrants from the former USSR – a considerable 
number form the Ukraine - were admitted in Germany since 1991 (Dietz 
2004). This immigration is related to a decision of the last GDR 
government to grant asylum to Jewish citizens from the Soviet Union who 
had come to East Germany because they were threatened by persecution 
in their home country. Following German reunification, entry visas for 
Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union were provided on the 
base of the so-called quota refugee regulation, guaranteeing a residence 
permit for an indefinite period and entitling Jewish immigrants to various 
rights and integration benefits. 
As a result of the admission regulations for ethnic Germans and Jewish 
refugees, immigration from the Ukraine to Germany was predominantly 
related to an ethnic and political background, although a limited number of 
labour migrants entered as well. Survey studies reveal that Germany is 
the number one destination country for Ukrainians, who plan to go abroad 
for work (IOM 1998, GfK 2006). Although (labour) migration from the 
Ukraine to Germany is strictly controlled, the increasing immigrant 
                                                 
9 This number includes all persons who have come to Germany in the context of the ‘Aussiedler’ 
regulation. A considerable part of them were not registered as Germans in the Ukrainian 
census, as they entered Germany as non German family members of Aussiedler. In addition to 
the return movement of ethnic Germans from other parts of the former Soviet Union into the 
Ukraine, this explains the comparatively small decrease of Germans in the Ukraine between 
1989 and 2001 (see table 2). 
Aspects of Diversity 
 
23
population from the Ukraine in Germany fostered family reunification and 
attracted co-citizens who were inclined to live and work in Germany. 
With the intention to facilitate travel and visits from the Ukraine, the 
German embassy relaxed visa procedures for Ukrainian citizens in the year 
2000. As a result, the number of Ukrainians who received a German 
tourist visa (Schengen visa) jumped up (figure 4). Although the relaxation 
of visa procedures had been withdrawn in the year 2003, a considerable 
immigration of Ukrainian citizens into various European Union countries 
manifested. 
Figure 4:  C- and D- Visa, issued by the German embassy to Ukrainian citizens 
0
50.000
100.000
150.000
200.000
250.000
300.000
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
C-Visa
D-Visa
 
C-Visa are short-term Schengen visa (max. 90 days) that relate to 
business, tourism, family visits 
D-Visa are national visa for family reunification, students, au-pairs 
Source: Foreign Office, Germany 
In the recent decade, tourist visa regulations have been used by a number 
of Ukrainian citizens to legally leave the Ukraine for an illegal job in 
European Union countries, particular in Portugal, Italy or Spain. 
Furthermore, criminal networks that smuggle and traffic people across 
European Union borders take advantage of tourist visa procedures. 
Smuggling networks demand a substantial amount of money to transport 
Ukrainian citizens with the help of regular tourist visa to perform illegal 
work in the European Union (Cipko 2006). As recent regularisation 
procedures in South European Union states, for example in Portugal, prove 
a high number of illegally occupied Ukrainians had entered the destination 
region between 2001 and 2002 with a Schengen visa issued in Germany 
(Baganha et al. 2004). In a similar way, survey studies with Ukrainian 
immigrants found a considerable share of illegal workers in the 
Netherlands and in Portugal having left the Ukraine with a German 
Schengen visa (Baganha et al. 2004, Shakhno and Pool 2005). 
Nevertheless, no evidence exists that a great number of those Ukrainians 
who used a German Schengen visa to leave the Ukraine for illegal work, 
actually stayed in Germany. 
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Labour migrants from the Ukraine in the enlarged European Union earn 
their wages predominately in low-skilled jobs, often on a short-term base 
and in economic sectors that are typically characterized by labour market 
segmentation, such as agriculture, construction, care and services 
(Drbohlav and Janska 2004, Baganha and Fonseca 2004, Cipko 2006). 
This supports an argumentation introduced earlier by segmented labour 
market theory which points to the demand for low paid labour in 
segmented markets as a driving force for the international movement of 
people. 
In recent years, Ukrainians citizens became an important new group in the 
foreign population of some European Union countries (see table 5). They 
can be found in Germany, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland. In the year 2004, Ukrainian 
citizens were among the top two foreign nationalities in the Czech and 
Slovak Republic, in Hungary, Poland and Portugal (Baganha and Fonseca 
2004, OECD 2006). In Germany, with a total foreign population of 6.7 
million, Ukrainians were on place eight in 2004, ahead of traditional 
migrant populations from Spain and Portugal. 
Table 5:  Stock of Ukrainian citizens in various European Union countries (in 
thousands) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Germany 40.0 51.4 63.8 76.8 89.3 103.5 116.0 126.0 128.1 
Italy 1.3 1.9 3.1 6.5 9.1 12.6 14.8 117.2 – 
Greece – – – – – 13.6 – – – 
Portugal – – – – – 46.4 62.0 64.8 65.8 
Spain – – – – – – 26.2 – 47.6 
Czech Rep. 46.3 43.4 52.7 65.9 50.2 51.8 59.1 62.3 78.3 
Hungary 12.0 7.2 9.9 11.0 8.9 9.8 9.9 13.1 13.9 
Slovakia 3.0 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.3 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.0 
Poland – – – – – – 9.9 – – 
– not available 
Sources: Portugal: Baganha and Fonseca 2004, Spain: Eurostat, others: 
OECD 2006 
Whereas traditional international labour migrations, for example the so 
called guest worker movement in Western and Northern Europe, resulted 
in a domination of men in the immigrant population, this can only partly 
be confirmed in the case of the Ukrainian population in European Union 
countries. Although in the Czech Republic and in Portugal, the immigration 
from the Ukraine is dominated by men who are occupied in construction 
and agriculture (Drbohlav and Janska 2004, Baganha and Fonseca 2004), 
significantly more Ukrainian women work in Italy and Slovakia, where they 
are engaged in (household) services and care. This reflects the 
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feminisation of international migrations in response to the growing 
demand for female labour10. 
Although the migration exchange between the Ukraine and Western states 
is nearly exclusively characterized by an out migration from the Ukraine, a 
very small West-East labour movement can be observed recently, linked 
to the inflow of capital and to the establishment of various programs 
sponsored by international organizations. Generally, labour migrants 
involved in these movements are highly-skilled professionals, experts and 
specialists, mainly coming from European Union countries, Canada and the 
USA. 
2.3 Future migration tendencies between the Ukraine  
 and the European Union 
In recent years, the Ukraine newly appeared as a sending country of 
(labour) migrants heading towards European Union states. With respect to 
future trends, some basic tendencies can be identified which are expected 
to shape the migration exchange between the Ukraine and European 
Union countries in the years ahead. 
Against the background of persistently high income differences between 
the Ukraine and European Union member states and the substantial 
(hidden) unemployment in the Ukraine, labour migrations can be predicted 
to continue. First of all migrants performing low skilled jobs are assumed 
to be involved in movements directed towards those European Union 
countries that demand flexible and short-term workers in low skilled 
occupations. According to survey studies, potential Ukrainian migrants 
name a broad range of European Union countries as target for potential 
labour migrations (IOM 1998, GfK 2006). This indicates the readiness of 
Ukrainians to move to those places where job opportunities have opened 
up. After Germany, East and South European Union states, France and 
Great Britain have been identified to be particularly favoured by Ukrainian 
labour migrants. 
With respect to the time dimension of labour migrations, empirical studies 
reveal a preference of Ukrainians towards (repeated) short-term trips and 
longer term temporary labour movements (IOM 1998, Mansoor and Quillin 
2006). However, in the case of long geographic distances and restrictive 
migration policies in receiving countries, labour migrants indicated to stay 
longer as wanted, because frequent back and forth movements between 
destination and home country may be related to high risks and costs 
(Shakhno and Pool 2005). 
As a general trend, irregular labour migrations between the Ukraine and a 
number of European Union countries can be assumed to persist. This has 
to be understood against the background of a considerable migration 
pressure in the Ukraine which is not controlled by Ukrainian laws any 
more, while European Union countries stick to a strict migration regime, 
                                                 
10  The increasing number of women participating in the labour force of advanced economies 
creates the demand for low paid female migrants who work in care and household services. 
This phenomenon has been described as global care chain (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002). 
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opening few options for legal labour migrants. At present, only a small 
part of labour migrations are based on bilateral (guest worker) 
agreements, to meet the labour market demands of receiving European 
Union states in a regulated way. Nevertheless, a number of European 
Union countries discuss the introduction of bilateral agreements on short-
term and seasonal labour migrations with the Ukraine. Whereas in the 
view of European Union countries bilateral agreements are understood as 
an effort to reduce illegal migrations, in the view of the Ukraine they are 
expected to contribute to the protection of the rights of Ukrainian labour 
migrants. 
A further group of migrants from the Ukraine into the European Union will 
consist of refugees, (ethnic) return migrants, students and persons, 
eligible for family reunion. In the case of (ethnic) return or diaspora 
migrants, predominantly Germany will be the destination region. Because 
legal provisions for admitting ethnic Germans and Jewish refugees from 
the Ukraine have recently been strengthened in Germany, these forms of 
movements can be expected to decrease. With respect to family 
reunification the opposite trend may establish, as an increasing migrant 
population from the Ukraine in European Union countries is eligible to 
invite following family members. 
Furthermore, transit movements, passing through the Ukraine in an 
attempt to reach the West, will contribute to population flows from this 
country into the European Union. Because of its geographic location, its 
comparatively generous immigration provisions and because of network 
relations with Asian and African countries, reaching back to the Soviet 
period, the Ukraine has emerged as an important transit route between 
East and West (Mansoor and Quillin 2006). Most migrants addressing the 
Ukraine for transit have experienced (civil) war, economic crisis, ethnic 
repression or ecological catastrophes in their home countries. They come 
from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Middle East and a number of African 
states. Because the European Union has tightened border controls in the 
East and restricted asylum regulations, many transit migrants got stuck in 
the Ukraine as they failed to enter those European Union countries they 
had originally addressed. Primarily because of its geographic location, the 
Ukraine can be expected to face considerable transit movements in the 
time to come. 
Table 6:  Natural population development, population aged 65 and more in the 
Ukraine (in percent) 
 199
1 
199
2 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
natural 
population 
decline 
-0.8 -1.9 -3.5 -4.7 -5.8 -6.0 -6.2 -6.0 
population 
aged 65+ 
12.0 12.6 12.7 13.1 13.5 13.7 13.8 14.0 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
natural 
population 
decline 
-7.1 -7.6 -7.6 -7.6 -7.5 -7.0 -7.6 
population 
aged 65+ 
14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.3 14.8 15.9 16.0 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 
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Although economic, social and policy factors identify the Ukraine as a 
potentially important migrant sending country with respect to the 
European Union, the demographic development in the Ukraine speaks 
against high emigrations (Zimmer 2007). Since 1991, the natural 
population development in the Ukraine is negative, the population is 
decreasing and ageing (see table 6). 
While the Ukraine lost 9.6% of its population between 1991 and 2006 due 
to the natural population decline, the percentage of people over 65 
increased from 12% to 16% in the same period. Projecting the natural 
population development for the year 2050, the United Nations population 
division found the Ukrainian population to decrease to 30.9 million people, 
predicting a natural population decline of 39% between 2006 and 2050, 
whereas the percentage of people in the age of 65 and older would reach 
27% in 2050. In the light of this demographic perspective, the Ukraine 
may not be capable in the longer run, to send large part of its working age 
population abroad. To the contrary, the decline in the working-age 
population will create a demand for labour in the Ukraine which most likely 
will have to be met by immigrants. 
3  The discourse on migration challenges in the enlarged 
European Union and the Ukraine 
The policy debate on the impact of migration plays a prominent role in all 
European Union countries, including the new East European Union 
member states. This has to be understood against the background of the 
demographic development in the European Union on the one hand and a 
generally reluctant attitude towards immigration in most European Union 
member states on the other. While long-term demographic projections of 
Eurostat point to the dependence of the future population growth in the 
European Union on net migration, politicians and the public in many 
European Union countries associate a number of negative economic and 
social consequences with the inflow of migrants. In contrast to these 
perceptions the results of economic studies on the impact of migration in 
receiving countries reveal a much more complex picture. 
3.1 The impact of migration on receiving countries 
Although the inflow of (labour) migrants bears the risk of increasing the 
unemployment of natives and depressing their wages, economic research 
has shown that these potential impacts depend on the labour market 
sectors and skill groups involved. If workers, performing low skilled jobs 
enter, low qualified natives may face unemployment or wage decreases 
(Borjas 1999). However, if immigration reacts to labour market shortages 
in specific sectors or skill groups, immigrants may not crowd out natives 
and may have – particularly in the case of highly-skilled workers – a 
positive effect on economic growth (Bauer et al. 2004: 32). Concerning 
the consequences for the welfare system, migrants’ skills and employment 
perspectives are decisive. Whereas highly-skilled labour migrants in secure 
labour market positions are expected to contribute to the welfare system, 
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low-skilled immigrants in jobs at risk are more likely to put a burden on 
the welfare state. 
Most economic studies find a comparatively low overall impact of labour 
migrations on the receiving economies, although migrations hold the risk 
of specifically affecting regional or sectoral labour markets (Friedberg and 
Hunt 1996, Longhi et al. 2005). Rather, migrations have been identified to 
contribute to economic prosperity in satisfying the demand for otherwise 
unavailable labour in demographically aging societies (Bauer et al. 2004: 
19). In recent migrations from the new East European Union member 
countries into the EU-15 immigrant workers have been found to 
complement native labour and thus ease labour market shortages (Heinz 
and Ward-Warmedinger 2006). Nevertheless, immigrations potentially 
result in a redistribution of incomes from native workers competing with 
immigrant labour to natives who are complements to labour migrants and 
to employers of immigrants. In the light of this consideration it is decisive 
to focus on the winners and losers from migration processes (Camarota 
2005: 10, IOM 2005: 168). 
Specific problems are related with illegal labour migrations as they 
challenge the concept of welfare states in the European Union in 
undermining the principle of solidarity on which the welfare states are 
based. Because illegal immigrants do not pay taxes and contributions into 
the national social security systems, their direct impact on publicly 
financed activities is negative. Furthermore, distorted competition may 
result as a consequence of illegal occupations because labour costs are 
lower for firms hiring illegals than for enterprises, paying official wages. 
Next to fiscal and economic concerns, the protection of human rights of 
irregular migrants is a pressing issue in European Union societies. Modern 
democracies can hardly accept an - however small - part of the population 
living in an extreme weak legal position, potentially subject to 
discrimination and exploitation (Mansoor and Quillin 2006: 16). 
Besides the economic impact of migration, European Union societies are 
confronted with the political and cultural consequences of migration 
movements as well. In the case of a high migration pressure from poor 
and instable countries, single European Union states and the European 
Union on the supra-national level are concerned of loosing control of 
borders and (national) sovereignty. This is particularly true in the case of 
illegal migration movements or human trafficking and smuggling which 
recently challenge the European Union at its Eastern borders. 
Furthermore, many European Union nation states and local communities 
oppose migration because of an anticipated increase of cultural diversity 
which is considered a challenge to national identity formation (Niessen et 
al. 2005: 5). 
3.2 The impact of migration on sending countries 
International migrations do not only have an impact on receiving, but also 
on sending states. In this context, two topics are of primary importance: 
the sending of remittances and the out migration of highly-skilled workers, 
i.e. brain drain. 
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Recent studies have pointed out that remittances are increasingly relevant 
for the transfer of resources to migrant sending states, predominantly in 
the case of developing and transition countries, such as the Ukraine (Buch 
and Kuckulenz 2004, Mansoor and Quillin 2006). After foreign investment, 
remittances are the second-largest source of financial flows to developing 
countries and they are generally higher than development aid (Ratha 
2003). In the case of the Ukraine this trend has manifested in the year 
2003, when remittances – which had been negligible before - surpassed 
development aid (see figure 5). It has to be considered though, that the 
official recording might severely underestimate remittances in the Ukraine, 
as a number of Ukrainian labour migrants do not send money back home 
by the banking system (Cipko 2006: 124). Particularly when the stay of 
workers abroad is short or when their occupation is illegal, migrants tend 
to use individual channels for sending money home. 
Among other factors such as education, income level, intention to invest 
or to insure the family at home against risks, the motivation of migrants to 
remit depends on the duration of stay. A recent study has shown that 
temporary migrants seem to be much more concerned in sending 
remittances home than permanent migrants (Glytsos 1997). This result 
suggests that countries as the Ukraine, where the share of short-term 
migrants is high, will particular profit from remittances. 
With respect to the effects of remittances for sending countries of labour 
migrants, different views are currently discussed. First of all, a number of 
positive impacts are expected, as remittances provide the home country’s 
economy with foreign exchange and additional means for consumption and 
investment. Although some studies found remittances to primarily 
increase family consumption but not investments in productive assets 
(Taylor 1992), there is evidence that both, the spending of remittances for 
consumption and for investment will sustain economic growth (Ratha 
2003). However, remittances might deteriorate the payment position of 
the economy (Dutch disease) and have distributive effects as well, as 
remittances are only transferred to a part of the home countries’ 
population therefore potentially leading to wealth disparities and social 
tensions (Buch and Kuckulenz 2004). Nevertheless remittances provide an 
important and stable additional source of income, which in the case of 
transition countries results in a reduction of poverty, at least in the short-
run (Manssor and Quillin 2006: 67). 
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Figure 5:  Foreign direct investment (FDI), development aid and remittances in 
the Ukraine (millions, in US $) 
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Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
In the recent discussions on the consequences of migrations in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, brain drain has been a crucial topic, 
although the dimensions of brain drain are difficult to identify, due to a 
lack of data. According to survey studies, conducted with Ukrainian 
migrants in the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Portugal, a 
remarkable number of labour migrants from the Ukraine are highly 
educated, although they perform low-skilled work in the receiving 
economies.11 
Concerning the effects of brain drain, usually negative economic 
consequences are associated with the emigration of highly-skilled 
professionals. However, recent studies have shown that the emigration of 
highly-skilled may encourage natives left behind to accumulate skills to 
also have an option for emigration. If these natives delay emigration and 
actually fill the gaps of skilled emigrants, negative economic effects would 
be reduced (Lundborg and Rechea 2002). Because the proportion of 
tertiary-educated persons in the Ukraine is high, the negative 
consequences of brain drain might have been mitigated. Furthermore, the 
increase of the enrolment ratio in tertiary education in the Ukraine that 
occurred between 1998/99 and 2002/2003 indicates a potential 
compensation of brain drain (see table 7). 
                                                 
11 In the Netherlands, a survey found 88% of questioned Ukrainian migrants having a tertiary 
education; while in Portugal 69% of the respondents in a survey study were highly educated 
(Shakhno and Pool 2005, Baganha et al. 2004). 
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Table 7:  Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary level in the Ukraine 
 (regardless of age, as a percentage of the population of official school 
age for that level) 
 1998-1999 2002-2003 
Men 44.1 56.5 
Women 50.5 67.2 
 
Source: UNESCO Database 
In the case highly-skilled migrants move back home after having acquired 
new skills abroad, they may contribute to the economic prosperity in their 
country of origin. In addition to valuable management experience, 
entrepreneurial skills and access to global networks, returning skilled 
migrants may even bring venture capital, enhancing economic growth and 
welfare at home. In less favourable conditions, comparatively skilled 
labour migrants return who have been occupied in jobs and sectors that 
required low qualifications (brain waste). Although these migrants can be 
expected to bring money back, positive consequences of migration on 
workers’ experience are not likely to materialize. 
4 European Union policy response towards external 
migration challenges: a first look 
After the European Union abolished internal border controls in 1997, 
common rules regarding visas, asylum rights and checks at external 
borders were adopted. With the enlargement of the European Union, a 
new migration space opened up at the common external borders in the 
East which made the need for a comprehensive European Union migration 
policy evident. As has been pointed out by European Union organizations 
and by NGO’s (for example the United Nations and the International 
Organization for Migration) the basic challenge for a comprehensive 
European Union migration policy is to move from migration control 
towards migration management in order to realize the potential gains of 
migration movements and to minimize its burden for receiving and 
sending states. 
So far the European Union has put most emphasis on the control and 
restriction of migration flows, to ensure what is considered the internal 
security of the European Union and to protect the labour markets and 
welfare systems of its member states. To a certain extend, this policy 
contradicted the new neighbourhood policy, admitted by the European 
Union commission in 2003 which aimed to strengthen the cooperation 
between the enlarged Europe and the countries bordering in the South 
and the East, such as the Ukraine (Aliboni 2005). Whereas European 
Union countries were primarily interested in an increased cooperation with 
migrant sending states neighbouring the European Union in the field of 
migration restriction and border control, the neighbouring non European 
Union states were demanding simplified visa procedures and an ease of 
access to European Union labour markets. 
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In managing migration movements from non European Union states, the 
enlarged European Union has agreed to address the following topics in a 
common effort: the control of external borders (preventing illegal 
migration and human smuggling and trafficking), the creation of a 
common asylum law and – in the longer run – the regulation of labour 
migrations. With respect to external border controls, i.e. fighting an 
expected inflow of illegal immigrants and preventing human smuggling 
and trafficking, the European Union primarily focused on traditional border 
security policy as well as on legal measures discouraging illegal 
immigrants and fighting people, involved in human smuggling and 
trafficking. First of all, the European Union strongly supported the new 
East European Union border states with financial and logistic resources to 
improve external border control.12 In a similar way, the negotiations with 
non European Union neighbouring states, such as the Ukraine focused on 
border security and immigration restraint. This policy approach has been 
reinforced by the agreement on the readmission of illegal migrants 
between the European Union and the Ukraine which has been signed in 
October 2006. In the view of the European Union this treaty has been a 
precondition for the negotiation of a simplified visa regime for Ukrainian 
citizens travelling into the European Union. 
In the field of asylum and refugee migration, the European Union member 
states reached a general agreement on minimum standards for granting 
and withdrawing refugee status in the European Union in April 2004. 
However, in the view of leading refugee assisting organizations, the 
European Union minimum standards on refugee protection were a step 
back with respect to asylum rights. The standards of refugee protection 
were considered to be minimal, indicating that asylum agreements have 
been reached at the lowest common denominator. The policy objective to 
reduce the inflow of asylum seekers and irregular migrants has 
materialized in the safe country concept which excludes persons from 
demanding asylum who either are citizens or enter from a country, defined 
safe. 
While the European Union has decided on a number of common 
regulations with respect to border controls and asylum procedures, labour 
migrations into the European Union have not yet been regulated on a 
common base. In recent years most European Union member states 
competed for highly-skilled labour migrants while the immigration of low-
skilled workers was seen with concern. However, unskilled, flexible labour 
is in demand in some sectors of a number of European Union economies, 
thus opposing a policy that tries to prevent the immigration of people, 
performing unskilled jobs (Castles 2006). In this context it has been 
proposed to work out policies – for example flexible systems for temporary 
and circular labour migration – that match the domestic sectoral demand 
for low-skilled migrant workers in European Union countries with the high 
migration potential in non European Union states, prepared to perform 
low-skilled work (GCIM 2005: 18). Nevertheless, these policies have to be 
                                                 
12 The European Union provided more than 900 million € in the period between 2004 and 2006 
to help the new EU member states to finance initiatives at the new external borders of the 
Union. 
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backed by a strong enforcement of rules on workers rights, to avoid the 
formation of a second-class category of workers. 
With respect to the planned common management of labour migrations, 
several European Union policy proposals have been presented so far which 
intended to channel labour migrations according to labour market 
requirements. A basic suggestion was to define the conditions of entry and 
residence of third country nationals with respect to categories of 
immigrants, such as seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees, 
especially skilled migrants and remunerated trainees. In addition a 
common fast-track procedure was proposed to admit migrants in the case 
of specific labour market and skill gaps (COM 2004: 5). While European 
Union member states in general agreed upon the necessity to introduce 
common European Union criteria for labour migration from non European 
Union countries, it was demanded to regulate the number of economic 
immigrants to be admitted on the national level. 
Experience with labour migrations in many European Union countries show 
that migrant workers tend to not return home if the chance to come back 
to the immigrant country is low. Thus the proposition has been formulated 
to guarantee an admission preference to those economic migrants who 
have already worked for some years in the European Union before 
returning temporarily back to their home country. This procedure could 
encourage “brain circulation” as migrant workers can count on a more 
favourable admission treatment if they wish to come back to a European 
Union country, after having returned to their country of origin. 
In order to manage labour migrations more effectively in the interest of 
sending and receiving countries alike, the European Union envisaged a 
closer cooperation with the sending countries of labour migrants. A step in 
this direction was the effort to provide solid information on the conditions 
of entry and work permissions into the European Union. This will be 
accomplished by setting up a European Union Immigration Portal and by 
the revision and development of the European Job Mobility Portal (EURES). 
Besides, the problem of “brain drain” has been put on the agenda which 
should be addressed in a common initiative of sending and receiving 
states, primarily by encouraging return or circular movements. 
In general, recent intentions of the European Union to regulate labour 
migrations from outside have favoured the support of short-term and 
circular movements. To a certain extend, this is a reasonable policy 
option, particularly because migrants from non European Union states in 
the East seem to prefer to return home in the longer run. Nevertheless 
this policy approach bears risks, because short-term labour migrants who 
happen to stay in the longer run potentially face constant marginalization 
in the receiving country (de Palo et al. 2006). 
5 Summary and conclusion 
After becoming independent in 1991, the Ukraine turned into a new 
migration space attracting and sending migrants to the successor states of 
the USSR and to the West. Whereas ethnic return movements dominated 
in the beginning of the 1990ies, economically motivated migrations 
prevailed in later years. This study demonstrated that migrations from the 
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Ukraine into European Union countries have increased recently and that a 
growing migration potential is envisaged in the years to come. Although a 
considerable part of these movements are expected to be temporary or 
circular, European Union countries face a potentially substantial labour 
migration from the Ukraine. As the number of Ukrainian citizens willing to 
enter the European Union will almost certainly exceed the legal 
opportunities currently in force, illegal migrations are likely to occur. 
In analyzing recent labour movements from the Ukraine into European 
Union countries, it becomes clear that some European Union states are 
particularly addressed by Ukrainian labour migrations. Whereas high 
income differences and a lack of job opportunities in the sending country 
trigger these movements in general, they are additionally based on 
traditional migration patterns and network relations in states such as 
Germany, Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the Slovak Republic. In other 
countries, such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, labour migrations 
from the Ukraine have developed in the absence of migrant networks, 
cultural and political ties. In these cases, the demand for low-skilled 
labour in segmented markets, particularly in the nontraded goods sectors 
of the economy seems to have supported the movement of Ukrainian 
labour migrants. With respect to the characteristics of Ukrainian migrants 
in European Union states, comparatively skilled persons – working in low-
skilled jobs - prevail, who mostly favour short-term and circular 
movements. Furthermore, the inflow from the Ukraine into European 
Union countries is dominated by females in some European Union 
countries and by males in others, depending on the demand structure for 
migrant labour. Concerning the choice of destination regions, the 
movements between the Ukraine and European Union countries reveal an 
increasing regional diversity since the end of the 1990ies. 
Although most European Union countries react reluctantly towards 
(labour) immigration from outside, long-term demographic projections 
point to its necessity in the light of a decreasing and ageing population in 
nearly all European Union states. While national migration experiences and 
national migration policies are different in European Union member states, 
the free movement of people within the territory of the European Union 
which signed the Schengen agreement resulted in the dependence of each 
member state on the immigration practice and policy of the others. Thus a 
common European Union migration policy was envisaged, aiming at the 
installation of a comprehensive and cooperative migration system which 
facilitates the movement of legal (labour) migrants, controls asylum 
seekers as well as refugees and prevents illegal border crossings. In 
response to a considerably migration pressure from outside its territory, 
the European Union additionally opted for an increasing cooperation with 
migrants’ sending states. Although the European Union has depicted a 
number of important issues in the context of common migration 
regulations, many of the proposed policy measurements are still 
indeterminate, particularly in the case of low-skilled labour movements. 
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Product Variety and Technical Change 
Richard Frensch / Vitalija Gaucaite-Wittich 
Abstract:∗ 
Motivated by growth models based on the variety of capital goods, recent 
empirical studies have established links between productivity  and various 
trade-based measures of product variety, carrying the implication that 
these measures may represent technology. We study this implication by 
explicitly proposing the variety of capital goods available for production as 
a direct measure of the state of technology. Within the growth and 
development framework of Jones (2002, ch. 6), we derive a “conditional 
technological convergence” hypothesis on how this variety should behave 
if it were indeed to represent the state of technology. The hypothesis is 
tested with highly disaggregated trade data, using tools from the income 
convergence literature. The results suggest that a trade-based count 
measure of the variety of available capital goods, allowing for product 
differentiation by country of origin, indeed behaves “as if” it represented 
technology when change of technology is understood as Jones’ (2002, ch. 
6) learning process, and that there is conditional technological 
convergence among our panel of mainly OECD and transition economies. 
JEL-Classification: F14, O33 
Keywords: Product variety, diffusion, adoption, technical change 
                                                 
∗ zu den Autoren: Richard Frensch, Osteuropa-Institut München and Department of Economics, 
University of Regensburg. Osteuropa-Institut München, Scheinerstr. 11, 81679 München, 
Germany. Email: frensch@oei-muenchen.de  
 Vitalia.Gaucaite, Statistics Division, Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations, Palais 
des Nations, 1211 Genève 10, Switzerland. Email: Vitalia.Gaucaite@unece.org 
 Colleagues in Geneva, Munich, and Regensburg, as well as conference and workshop 
participants in Freiberg, Regensburg, Naples, Moscow and Kiel provided ample comments. 
Special thanks are due to Laura Altinger, Fabrizio Carmignani, Michael Funke, Johannnes 
Stephan, and two anonymous referees for numerous suggestions for improvement. Lant 
Pritchett provided invaluable editorial guidance. Richard Frensch acknowledges financial 
assistance from a Bavarian Ministry of Science forost grant. 
Arbeitspapier Nr. 42 
 
40 
1 Introduction: the variety of capital goods 
as a potential measure of technology 
New theories of growth emphasise ideas as the centre of innovative 
activity. As ideas are non-rival and partially excludable, innovation, by 
tying ideas to new products or processes, obeys increasing returns to scale 
(Romer, 1990). When introducing this concept into a monopolistic 
competition model, technical progress is reflected in a higher variety of 
intermediate capital goods, and is thus embedded in a deepening division 
of labour, as already illustrated in Adam Smith’s example of the making of 
pins. 
In spite of the advances of theories of growth, there has so far been little 
reflection of this insight in empirical attempts at measuring technical 
change. In a recent overview, Keller (2004, p. 757) does not mention 
product variety as a potential measure of technology but rather holds that 
“technology is an intangible that is difficult to measure directly. Three 
widely used indirect approaches are to measure (1) inputs (R&D), (2) 
outputs (patents), and (3) the effect of technology (higher productivity).” 
This paper fills this gap by defining the state of technology as the range of 
specialised production processes, by proposing the variety of capital goods 
available for production, as a direct measure of the state of technology, 
and by deriving and testing a hypothesis how this variety should behave if 
it were indeed to represent the state of technology. 
While this seems unrelated to trade, trade enters the picture when it 
comes to measuring product variety, as trade data are best suited to 
meaningfully measure variety. Consequently, we proxy the variety of 
available capital goods by the variety of traded (i.e., exported and/or 
imported) capital goods. This measurement issue relates our work to a 
recently emerged and rapidly growing field, the study of trade-based 
measures of product variety. 
2 Recent developments in studying 
disaggregated trade data  
There is an increasing tendency to use highly disaggregated trade data to 
infer information both on trade and – in the absence of equally highly 
disaggregated production data – also on productivity issues. All of these 
approaches are united by the idea that there is something systematic in 
the structure or composition – beyond the sheer volume – of trade. A 
large part of this work “re-aggregates” the disaggregated information, not 
in volume, but in terms of measures of product variety or quality found in 
the trade data.13 These papers usually come in two versions: they either 
                                                 
13  While we follow this line of making use of disaggregated trade data here, there is also work 
that questions the implicit assumption that the product space is homogeneous and 
independent of the specialisation of a country. According to this type of work, comparative 
advantage is determined by costly search for goods associated with higher productivity levels 
(Hausmann and Klinger, 2006), and initial specialisation in products – rather than industries – 
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study the determinants or the effects of the variety/quality aspects of 
traded goods. In both respects, they may do so from two different 
potential perspectives, i.e. trade or productivity. So far, the determinants 
of the variety or quality of traded goods have mostly been studied from 
the trade perspective, while on the effects side, studies on productivity 
implications prevail. 
As for the determinants of the variety or quality of traded goods in the 
trade perspective, Hummels and Klenow (2005) find that the higher 
exports of larger economies are to a considerable extent due to their 
exporting a wider set of goods – or categories of  a trade classification –, 
with larger economies generally exporting a given category to more 
countries. Within the same categories, richer countries export higher 
quality goods, confirming Schott (2004). On the trade effects side, Funke 
and Ruhwedel (2002) find a positive link from the variety of exports to 
export performance in volume terms. 
In this paper, we are not interested in trade related determinants or 
effects of trade-based measures of product differentiation, rather we want 
to know whether they carry information on technology. That they might 
can be theoretically motivated, as spelled out in Feenstra et al. (1999, p. 
318): “The idea that productivity is enhanced by increases in product 
variety is central to the endogenous growth models considered by Romer 
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991).” As this link is so basic, it 
might be worth wile to stress that the product variety driving productivity 
in Romer-type models in fact is the variety of intermediate capital goods 
used in production. Specifically, this particular variety is a measure of the 
state of the endogenous technology in Romer (1990) and related growth 
models, which we will henceforth refer to as capital-goods-variety-based 
growth models.  
The alleged productivity-increasing property of more product variety has 
recently been studied in attempts to relate levels or growth rates of 
productivity to several measures of variety. The results suggest that 
across OECD and selected east Asian or east European countries one can 
find trade-based measures of variety, which – together with physical 
investment – are significant for explaining variations in per capita income 
levels,14 and contribute to differences in productivity growth.15 Although 
implicitly (or even explicitly, as Feenstra et al., 1999; or Funke and 
Ruhwedel, 2001 and 2005) rooted in capital-goods-variety-based growth 
models, these papers typically report export variety measures over all 
goods to be correlated with productivity.16  
                                                                                                                                            
exported by higher income countries is associated with faster growth ( Hausmann et al., 
2005).  
14  See Funke and Ruhwedel (2001 and 2005) and this paper’s authors’ earlier work in UNECE 
(2004). 
15  This has been shown to be the case for the productivity lead of South Korea over Taiwan 
(Feenstra et al., 1999).  Addison (2003) suggests that a relationship between the variety of 
exported industrial goods and total factor productivity might also hold in terms of growth rates 
across a sample of 29 developed and developing countries. 
16  As an exception, Amiti and Konings (2005) suggest a link from the import variety of 
intermediate inputs to productivity gains at the firm level for Indonesia, concluding from the 
comparatively large productivity gains accruing from lowering input versus output tariffs. 
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Consequently, as claiming to be rooted in capital-goods-variety-based 
growth models, two limitations hold for this type of studies. First, as 
formulated in Feenstra et al. (1999, p 326), “... the variety of exports 
from one country are in principle available to other countries through 
trade, so that productivity in each country does not depend on only the 
export variety from the same country: it would also depend on the matrix 
of import varieties from all of its trading partners. We do not have the 
data to measure this, however ... Ignoring import variety is clearly a 
limitation on our approach.” Second, the relevant product group to be 
examined when testing for productivity implications of variety, rooted in 
capital-goods-variety-based growth models,  is not all goods but rather 
intermediate capital goods used in production. Taking both limitations 
together, when using trade-based variety measures to explicitly or 
implicitly test capital-goods-variety-based growth models, the alleged 
productivity effect to be studied would in fact stem from the variety of 
traded (i.e., exported and/or imported) intermediate capital goods to 
productivity, where the variety of trade proxies the variety of available 
capital goods, due to the absence of highly disaggregated production data. 
This is not to deny the possibility of links between other trade-based 
variety measures and productivity. In fact, there may be a number of 
channels for productivity effects of an increased variety of goods, and tfps 
differ across countries and time for reasons other than differences in 
technology (Prescott, 1998). However, these links should not be 
interpreted as rooted in capital-goods-variety-based growth models, but 
rather in the light of other models that allow for productivity effects from 
variety, when variety is specifically not a measure of technology, such as 
in Acemoglu and Ventura (2002), stressing the returns to diversifying 
export bundles.  
Furthermore, when taking the foundation in capital-goods-variety-based 
growth models seriously, trade-based measurement of product variety 
should enable a direct test why there should be productivity effects of the 
variety of traded capital goods in the first place: If this particular variety is 
a measure of the state of technology, it should behave as a measure of 
technology, i.e., one might ask for the determinants of product variety 
from a growth perspective. This latter point has so far been only taken up 
in Addison (2003), however, without an explicit base in a growth model: 
according to his study, the introduction of new export categories in 
countries with already very high levels of export variety appears to be 
driven by R&D.  In contrast, countries that are furthest away from the 
frontier of export variety tend to experience the highest variety growth 
rates, which lends support to the existence of a diffusion process, where a 
combined effect of educational attainment and the original variety gap 
increases the growth rates of export variety in developing countries. 
Our contribution is to structurally test a model of capital goods variety 
growth, i.e., to explicitly derive a testable hypothesis on the rate of capital 
goods variety growth and taking it to the data. The rest of the paper is 
organised as follows: the first part of section 3 presents the theoretical 
framework (Jones, 2002, ch.6, based on Jones, 2003), where a view of 
technical change as learning how to deal with newly innovated varieties of 
intermediate capital goods is embedded into a simple growth model. In 
the second part of section 3, we derive a testable “conditional 
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technological convergence” hypothesis within this framework. Section 4 
introduces our unique panel database of highly disaggregated trade-based 
product variety measures, allowing for product differentiation by country 
of origin. In section 5, we test the conditional technological convergence 
hypothesis using tools from the income convergence literature. In sections 
6 and 7, we test the robustness and plausibility of our results. Section 8 
concludes.  
3 A testable hypothesis on the variety of available capital 
goods as a measure of technology 
3.1. Theoretical framework: Jones (2002, ch. 6) 
This framework of our analysis is Jones’ (2002, ch. 6) “simple model of 
growth and development,” where the change of a country’s state of 
technology is modelled as a process of learning to deal with new varieties 
of intermediate capital goods, exogenously innovated anywhere in the 
world. Final output Y is produced by labour, L, and a range or variety, h, 
of available intermediate capital goods, xj, according to  
 ∫−= h j djxLY
0
1 αα  (1) 
neglecting the time dimension. Newly innovated designs of intermediate 
capital good varieties are available everywhere without technology 
transfer cost such that intermediate capital goods can be produced at the 
place of use. The variety of capital goods used in production, h, represents 
the state of technology of production in the Smithian sense of the division 
of labour. This becomes especially clear, when one unit of an intermediate 
capital good is produced without further input from one unit of raw capital, 
K, and when all intermediate capital goods are priced equally: then, xj = x 
for all j, h·x = K, and the aggregate production function takes the familiar 
Solow-form, 
 
αα −⋅= 1)( LhKY  (2) 
illustrating the labour-augmenting character of technology h. Introducing 
the time dimension, physical capital accumulation follows the standard 
form, )()()( tKdtYstK k ⋅−=& , where sk is the rate of investment and d 
denotes the rate of depreciation of capital. Labour L grows exogenously at 
rate n. Technical change reflects a process of labour’s learning to adopt 
and use new intermediate capital good varieties, invented where ever.17 
Specifically,    
                                                 
17  This is in the spirit of theoretical approaches such as Keller’s (1996) formalisation of 
“absorptive capacity”, going back to Nelson and Phelps (1966), or Basu and Weil’s (1998) 
concept of an “appropriate technology.” Both stress the idea that the labour force of a firm or 
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 ,)()()(
1 γγψµ −= thtAeth u& 0>µ  and  10 ≤< γ  (3) 
Apart from the initial technology gap vis-à-vis the world technology 
frontier A, learning success depends on time dedicated to formal 
education, i.e. length of schooling, u,  the effectiveness of formal 
education (ψ/γ, to which we will return below), and on other influences on 
the productivity of the learning process, summarised by µ. Individual 
countries take A as given, which expands at a constant rate, g.18 Re-
writing (3) in terms of the growth rate of h, and defining B(t) = h(t)/A(t) 
as the variety of capital goods available in a country relative to what is 
available at the world technology frontier, 
 
γψµ −= )(
)(
)( tBe
th
th u&
 (4) 
Moving towards the technology frontier slows down the speed of 
technological catch-up. Technology gap concepts such as (4), based on 
Gerschenkron’s (1952) notion of the advantage of backwardness,  are 
highly popular in empirical approaches dealing with diffusion and adoption. 
In particular, a number of studies take (4) as the direct point of departure 
for econometric specification, often hypothesising combined effects 
between education parameters and a measure of initial relative technology 
on the speed of diffusion (inter alia Nelson and Phelps, 1966, Griffith et al. 
2000, and in our variety context also Addison, 2003). We deem the 
underlying assumption that both components have a significant effect on 
the dependent variable if the coefficient of the combined effect is 
statistically significant, as problematic. Accordingly, rather than following 
the combined effects avenue, we derive an empirically testable hypothesis 
from (4) that has the advantage that it clearly separates the various 
influences on our proposed direct measure of technology, i.e. the variety 
of capital goods available for production.  
The steady-state properties of the model can be used to motivate the 
particular, exponential form of the learning process (3). As the choice of 
length of schooling, u, is a private investment decision, we should have 
(3) be consistent with what we know about returns to this investment 
decision. Formally, the model is an augmented Solow-model, in which sk, 
u, the growth rate of the labour force, n, and the rate of expansion of the 
technology frontier, g, are all exogenous and constant. As the growth rate 
of h is constant in the steady state, (4) then requires B to be constant 
such that A and h must grow at the same rate. Therefore, along the 
steady-state growth path, 
                                                                                                                                            
a country, in order to be able to successfully adopt new technologies, needs to have certain 
skills. 
18  This is in line with the evidence that A increases over time due to innovations in only a very 
few advanced economies. While their share in world GDP was 64 per cent in 1995, the seven 
largest industrialised countries accounted for 84 per cent of the world’s R&D spending (Keller, 
2004, p. 752). 
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where µ must be sufficiently small to ensure that B* < 1. Note that capital 
accumulation and the learning process (3) are independent from each 
other, such that the model preserves the neoclassical property of a 
constant steady-state capital-output ratio, K*/Y*. h is labour augmenting 
so that the growth rate of h determines the growth rates of capital per 
worker and output per worker. The steady-state level of output per worker 
can then easily be shown (Jones, 2002, p. 128) to be  
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With perfect competition on the labour market, the Cobb-Douglas 
production function (2) establishes a steady-state real wage 
*** )()1(/)()( tyLtYtw t α−=∂∂= , and  
γ
ψ=∂
∂
u
tw *)(ln
, 
i.e., additional time of schooling increases the wage rate by a constant 
percentage, ψ/γ. The particular functional form of the learning process 
(3), chosen in Jones (2002), thus provides for consistency of the model 
with Mincer’s (1974) approach to wage formation, supported by 
subsequent empirical work (see Pritchett, 2006). We will make use of this 
property in discussing the plausibility of our empirical results in section 7. 
3.2.  Conditional technological convergence  
In order to study the convergence properties of h,19 we employ the usual 
instrument of growth theory for this purpose, i.e. we linearise (4) in ln 
B(t) around the steady state ln B* by using a first-order Taylor-expansion, 
to arrive at,  
( )[ ]
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From the definition of the steady state in (5), this implies 
                                                 
19  For the closed-form solution of h(t), see Appendix 1. 
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As )(/)()( tAthtB =  , 
gthtAthtB −=−= )()()()( δδδδ  
and, with (6), 
 )(lnln)(ln)( tBgBgdt
tBd
tB γγδ −≈= ∗  (7) 
Denoting )()(ln tztB = , and assuming the equality holds, equation (7) is a 
simple linear differential equation of the type 
),()( tgzgztz γγ −= ∗&  
with the straightforward explicit solution 
( )gtgt ezeztz γγ −∗− −+= 1)( 0 . 
Accordingly, 
( ) ∗−− −+= BeBetB gtgt ln1ln)(ln 0 γγ  
and 
( ) )ln(ln1ln)(ln 00 BBeBtB gt −−=− ∗−γ  
Substituting back for  ),(ln)(ln)(ln tAthtB −=   
( ) )ln(ln1ln)(lnln)(ln 000 BBeAtAhth gt −−=+−− ∗−γ  
and  
( ) )ln(ln1)ln)((lnln)(ln 000 BBeAtAhth gt −−+−=− ∗−γ  
The world technology frontier is assumed to expand at a constant rate, ,g  
according to gteAtA 0)( =  such that gtAtA += 0ln)(ln  and  
( ) )ln(ln1ln)(ln 00 BBegthth gt −−+=− ∗−γ   (8) 
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where 10 ≤< γ   and  g, the rate of innovation, is small. As the time horizon 
of our empirical assessment will be comparatively short (see section 5.2), 
we already at this stage approximate gte γ− in (8) by gtγ−1 , such that 
.1 gte gt γγ =− −  Consequently, 
)ln(lnln)(ln 00 BBgtgthth −+=− ∗γ  
and 
 .lnln/)ln)((ln 00 BgBggthth γγ −+=− ∗  (8’) 
From the definition of the steady-state in (5), 
 
 
and 
 (9) 
Interpreting (9) in discrete time, thht /)ln(ln 0− is an average yearly rate of 
change of the variety of available capital goods, as a measure of 
technology, which depends negatively on initial variety and positively on 
formal education parameters, and on other influences on the productivity 
of the learning process, µ.20  
4 Measuring available product variety and some stylised 
facts  
Variety measures are commonly derived from detailed data on 
merchandise trade, where export variety is taken to proxy the variety of 
domestic production. As goods may be available in a country due to 
production at home or from imports, simple trade-based count measures 
of produced, imported, or available variety then record the number of 
different categories exported, imported, or traded, where data detail 
obviously depends on the level of aggregation of the trade classification 
used.  
Our data set covers exports of 46 countries-reporters, among them 
transition economies from eastern Europe and the CIS, and OECD 
economies from Europe and North America, between 1992 and 2004 to 
the rest of the world, and these countries’ imports from 55 selected 
partner countries, which account for the bulk of their total imports. We 
derive variety measures from these data according to the lowest 
aggregation level of the SITC, Rev. 3 (5- and 4-digit basic headings) in the 
UN COMTRADE database. This level of aggregation covers 3,114 basic 
                                                 
20  We are enormously indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out a small mistake in our 
original derivation of (9). Only correcting this mistake enabled the formulation of section 7 
below.  
µψγγ lnln)lnln(/)ln)((ln 000 gughgAggggthth ++−+−=−
),ln(ln/1ln ugB ψµγ +−=∗
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headings, or SITC categories, while the United Nations Statistics Division’s 
Classification by BEC (Broad Economic Categories) allows for almost all of 
these SITC categories to be grouped into basic SNA activities, namely 272 
primary good categories, 1,627 intermediate good categories, 471 capital 
good categories,  and 704 consumer good categories.21  
As we will be testing for convergence, we would want to avoid finding 
convergence by data construction, which is highly likely when using simple 
count measures based on the SITC 5 digit level; there are more than 
3,000 categories but fewer than 500 of them cover capital goods 
according to BEC, which is not many, and most OECD countries indeed 
trade (i.e., either export or import) almost all of them. However, variety 
measurement may go beyond counting. More sophisticated measures 
include especially Feenstra’s  (1994) exact measure of product variety 
constructed from a CES function when products enter non-symmetrically. 
In line with Feenstra and Kee (2007), we construct such exact variety 
measures, which are comparable both across years and across countries, 
by defining a consistent benchmark that does not itself vary over time and 
at the same time encompasses as many of our sample countries as 
possible. Given our data limitations (not all countries report in each year), 
this benchmark set is defined as Ia, the total set of categories traded by 
the “aggregate country” of all original OECD economies, as defined in 
Table A2 of the paper, over all years between 1992 and 2004; then, piaqia 
is the average value of trade for category i, summed over all OECD 
economies and averaged across years 1992 and 2004. Only “by 
aggregating across countries and over time, we obtain a consistent 
comparison set ... Ia, that does not itself vary over time” (Feenstra and 
Kee, 2007, p. 10).22 
Accordingly, the appropriate Feenstra-measure for assessing product 
variety of country c in period t for our purposes of comparing variety both 
across years and across countries, is given by equation (4) in Feenstra 
and Kee (2007), 
 ∑
∑
∈
∈=
a
c
t
Ii
a
i
a
i
Ii
a
i
a
ic
t qp
qp
Variety , (10) 
which depends on the set of categories traded by country c at time t, Itc, 
but not on the value of this trade. Varietytc can be interpreted as the share 
of OECD-traded goods during 1992–2004 also traded by country c in year 
t. Clearly, for non-OECD economies, this share is a virtual share. 
Inspection of the distributions of these measures, based on the SITC 5 
digit commodity level of our data, demonstrates that it alleviates but does 
not eliminate the convergence bias problem: the share of OECD-traded 
goods during 1992–2004 also traded by country c in year t is very close to 
1 for OECD countries in each year, as most OECD countries indeed trade 
almost all of the categories on the SITC 5 digit level.  
                                                 
21  For a comprehensive description of our trade-based variety measurement, see Appendix 2. 
22  Also, see their fn. 1, criticizing their earlier approach in this respect, e.g., as in Feenstra and 
Kee (2004). 
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The way to escape the convergence bias problem is therefore not by 
weighting count data, but to increase data detail by expanding the product 
space. When using the SITC 5 digit level, this can be achieved by 
differentiating categories by their country of origin, such that a German 
car is differentiated from a Japanese car, etc. Using the country of origin 
enables us to introduce an additional dimension of variety, one which is 
absent in other data sources. The number of SITC categories produced at 
home (proxied by the number of exported categories) plus the number of 
imported SITC categories times the respective number of origin countries 
then corresponds to a count measure, which we term the product variety 
available within a country, i.e. available product variety. In this paper, we 
will deal exclusively with this definition of variety, for which we can 
identify a maximum count of 174,384, since a country-reporter plus all 55 
partner countries can each supply all 3,114 SITC categories to the 
country-reporter. With an average of 40.2 countries reporting per year 
between 1992 and 2004, computing our product variety measures thus 
requires the manipulation of some 90 million data points. 
While theoretically less robust than the Feenstra measure, this simple 
count measure over an expanded product space defined by product 
differentiation by country of origin, deals with the convergence bias 
problem a lot better by spreading the variance in the data far more 
evenly. The most preferable solution would thus be defining a Feenstra-
measure over our expanded product space, allowing for product 
differentiation by country of origin. Again, in order to then consistently 
measure variety across countries and over time, we would have to define 
a benchmark “aggregate country.” In the expanded product space, this 
would have to be the aggregate of all our economies, as any subset of 
countries would tend to introduce a new bias into the data: allowing for 
country of origin in product differentiation introduces the geographical 
specialisation of imports into the product space, which differs from country 
to country. However, as not all of our countries report trade for all years, 
we cannot define a consistent variety measure à la Feenstra and Kee 
(2007) by aggregating across all countries and over time. As any subset of 
countries, such as the OECD, when chosen as the benchmark, would 
introduce the geographic specialisation bias, the size of which we cannot 
really assess, we stick with our count measure over the expanded product 
space. 
In Figure 1 we present available product variety count measures by BEC 
groups for the year 2000, where primary and intermediate goods are 
aggregated for ease of exposition. Countries are ranked in descending 
order of available variety for capital goods but sorting countries by each 
measure of variety reveals more or less the same rough groupings: the 
highest degrees of variety occur in west European and North American 
economies, followed by east European EU member countries, then by 
southeastern Europe, and finally the CIS. There are a few notable 
exceptions to the general pattern, however, the most striking being 
Iceland, Cyprus, and Malta among the western economies and Russia 
among the transition countries. The three very small islands, that 
specialise in producing and exporting a narrow range of goods and 
services, are also in the lowest ranks with respect to available variety, 
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while Russia displays degrees of variety similar to that of high-income 
economies. 
– Figure 1 about here – 
The fact that Russia, and also Ukraine, stand out from the other CIS 
countries in variety terms in part reflects the legacy of the Soviet Union’s 
central planning system, which determined who produced what and did 
not reflect comparative advantages across the Union. Hence, while many 
ex-Soviet republics produced too little variety, Russian and Ukrainian 
enterprises were subsidised to produce too much of it, albeit of low 
quality.23  
During our period of observation, product variety increases in western 
Europe and North America were almost entirely due to the “geographic 
spread of trade,” i.e. to trading with more partners than before, and only 
marginally to more categories being exported or imported at our level of 
aggregation.24 For the reforming east European and CIS economies, 
however, both factors played an important role. A rapid liberalisation of 
their trade led to a geographical diversification that went well beyond the 
substitution of new western for old eastern trading partners. However, 
during the 1990s, there were also many more SITC categories being 
imported or produced at home and exported than before, which allow for 
an important increase in variety available domestically in most east 
European and CIS economies. This applies especially to capital and 
intermediate goods, the relative variety of which used to lag behind that of 
consumer goods in many of these economies prior to reforms. This 
corresponds to Kehoe and Ruhl’s (2002) result that trade liberalisation 
generally implies that goods traded the least prior to liberalisation account 
for much higher shares afterwards.  
5  Empirical assessment 
5.1.  Assessing technical change through product variety  
Testing whether trade-based measures of available product variety indeed 
contain information on technology requires making use of the data within 
an econometric framework that matches the conditional technological 
convergence hypothesis (9) as closely as possible. Any such attempt is 
deeply entrenched in the interdependence between technology, trade, and 
income. Resolving this interdependence might call for a simultaneous 
equations approach: variety should depend on trade, trade on income, 
                                                 
23  Russia remains a major supplier of industrial goods to most of its CIS neighbours and to other, 
mainly developing, economies. In our previous work in UNECE (2004), we report a notable 
discrepancy between Russia’s high rank (and also Ukraine’s, to some extent) for variety and its low 
rank for quality, which to a certain degree reflects a delay in industrial restructuring.  
24  For data on 1992–2001, see Table 6.22 in UNECE (2004, p. 150). On the export side, this 
particular feature has been noticed and termed “geographic spread of trade” (Evenett and 
Venables, 2002). Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) show that  the 1986–92 trade 
liberalisation in Costa Rica led to a large increase in the average number of countries from 
which product categories are drawn, supporting the notion of “geographic spread of trade” 
also on the import side.  
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and income on variety via a technology channel. Modelling this would 
probably be very demanding, especially when considering the hitherto 
unclarified nature of the trade-income relationship (cf. Rodríguez, 2006). 
Rather, given the BEC grouping into primary, intermediate, capital, and 
consumption goods, we formulate a short-cut through this web of 
endogeneity. At the core of capital-goods-variety-based models of growth 
is the formulation that the variety of capital goods available for production 
constitutes a technology parameter. This implies that the variety of 
consumption goods available in a country does not constitute technology 
but is a pure trade measure, i.e., consumer goods variety depends on 
income via trade but does not influence income via a technology channel. 
Accordingly, we define the available variety of capital goods relative to the 
available variety of consumer goods, i.e. CGVjt = VarCapjt/VarConjt, as a 
technology-relevant variety measure, where VarCapjt and VarConjt are the 
available variety count measures of country j at time t of capital and 
consumer goods, respectively, as defined in section 4, i.e., measured as 
the number of exported categories plus the number of imported categories 
times their places of origin. CGVjt potentially influences income via a 
technology channel but does not depend on trade – and thus on income – 
unless there are asymmetrical effects on capital and consumption variety 
via trade, for which we will have to control.25 
Also, in order to test for potential technology-related information in goods 
used in production other than capital goods, we define two additional 
variety measures, the available variety of primary goods relative to the 
available variety of consumer goods, i.e. PGVjt = VarCapjt/VarPrimjt, and 
the available variety of intermediate goods relative to the available variety 
of consumer goods, i.e. IGVjt = VarIntjt/VarConjt, where VarPrimjt and 
VarIntjt and are defined analogously to VarCapjt and VarConjt. 
5.2. Data and specification  
Dependant variables 
We test the conditional technological convergence hypothesis (9) on 
average yearly growth rates of our thee variety measures defined above, 
i.e. on (log CGVj,t+T  – log CGVjt)/T, (log IGVj,t+T  – log IGVjt)/T, and (log 
PGVj,t+T  – log PGVjt)/T, with T as the length of the period under 
consideration. 
                                                 
25  While previous studies have established links between increases in the variety of all products 
exported out of a country and productivity increases in this country, potentially motivated by 
Acemoglu and Ventura (2002), there is no theoretical reason and no indication that the same 
would hold for increases in the variety of traded consumer products. However, to make sure 
this undesirable effect is not hidden in our identification strategy, we also conduct conditional 
convergence tests with defining the import – rather than the traded – variety of capital goods 
relative to the import variety of consumer goods as the potential technology-relevant variety 
measure. As our tests indicate that this does not qualitatively change the results presented 
below, we prefer the definition given here, which is closer to our theoretical model. 
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Explanatory variables derived from the hypothesis (9) 
In the framework of conditional technological convergence, initial states 
are given by log CGVjt, log PGVjt, or log IGVjt, respectively. On the right 
hand side of equation (9), u refers to the length of schooling, and ψ /γ to 
returns to schooling, which are presumably interdependent: the individual 
choice of length of schooling responds to the returns to schooling. Here, 
however, we abstract from these interdependencies and retreat to the 
usual assumptions prevailing in the empirical literature on skill acquisition 
and assume especially that ψ /γ is constant. 
From the steady state in (5), we know that µ is restricted in order to 
support h* ≤ A. We might leave it at this, and see µ just as a scaling 
parameter. However, also compatible with the functional form (3), one 
might interpret µ as collecting additional influences on the productivity of 
the learning process. As we know from Keller (2004) and Comin and 
Hobijn (2004) that empirically the most important influences on the 
adoption of technology – other than education variables – are a country’s 
own innovative activities, we try to collect indicators related to this. A data 
mining exercise with the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
produced variables described in Table A4, on population density, the share 
of urban population, and the sum of residents’ and non-residents’ patent 
applications. However, as data availability on all these variables is 
restricted, we start testing hypothesis (9) without these variables. Rather, 
we test for their potential influence as part of our sensitivity tests in 
section 6. 
This leaves us with one steady state variable, i.e. the length of schooling, 
which we measure in average years per person aged between 25 and 65, 
u25j,tT, for the period tT between t and t+T. We use data from the updated 
Barro-Lee set (Barro and Lee, 2000) with the caveat that for our purposes 
this data set, while representing the best available, has shortcomings: a 
principal problem “is the comparability over time of match between the 
educational categories in the survey data” (Pritchett, 2006, p. 656). In 
addition, they measure education of labour force aged population not 
labour force, i.e., there is no correction for participation rates, which 
differs across countries and by gender; also, there is no correction for 
school quality. Furthermore, we know that individuals also acquire skills 
outside of formal education, and experience is about as important as 
formal education. Finally, the Barro-Lee data set contains only limited 
information on transition economies (for more detail, see Table A4 in the 
appendix).  
Control variables 
Initial variety, educational parameters, and additional potential influences 
on the productivity of the learning process, µ, are all explanatory variables 
we can identify strictly from the hypothesis (9). In order to test the 
hypothesis, however, we need to control for influences on changes in h 
other than from (9).  
Most importantly, (9) is a hypothesis on technical change in a model 
without explicit trade, while we measure h as trade-based variety. In 
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order to test (9) with trade-based variety measures, we have to isolate 
the potential technology information in trade-based variety data and 
control for the trade information in these data. This we achieve by 
normalising potential technology variables by a pure trade variety 
variable, the available variety of consumer goods. This normalisation then 
requires controlling for different overall demand effects on different types 
of goods, which we do by including inv_conj,t+T  – inv_conjt, i.e. the change 
in the investment-consumption ratio. 
Second, there are potential size effects to be controlled for: empirical work 
on trade-based variety data suggests that there are fixed costs of trading 
varieties (Hummels and Klenow, 2005). As mentioned, however, our 
empirical tests control for the trade aspect of our data, leaving the 
potential technology information. This is to say, we need not control for 
fixed costs of trading varieties. However, our hypothesis (9) assumes 
costless technology transfer, i.e. the design of newly innovated capital 
good varieties is available everywhere without further cost. This is most 
probably too simple a picture: designs have to be adapted to specific 
markets, licenses have to be traded. All this implies that there are costs of 
new technology adoption – in the sense of design transfer before capital 
good varieties can be used in a new market. Whether these costs are 
variable with market or labour force size (as suggested by Easterly et al., 
1994) or fixed, much as fixed costs of innovation (as suggested in Romer, 
1994), is actually an empirical question. If there are fixed costs of 
technology adoption, we should be able to still find country size effects in 
our data, even after controlling for trade influences. 
How can we form prior expectations on how to enter country size effects 
into the testing equation? Although our theoretical model assumes no such 
costs, we can argue in the spirit of the model. Fixed costs of new 
technology adoption would alter the steady state effects of length of 
schooling on technology, in equation (5). Although the specific form of this 
alteration is unclear, we do not think that it would make much sense to 
model market size as a perfect substitute for education. Empirically, such 
an approach would assume that market size is a limiting factor for 
technology adoption and use for Germany, as compared to the larger US, 
as much as for Cyprus, as compared to the larger Czech Republic. This is 
very unlikely to be the case. Rather, both the spirit of our model and the 
expected size of fixed costs of new technology adoption and use suggest 
that lack of size might  limit the steady state effects of length of schooling 
on technology in equation (5) only until a certain threshold size. This 
suggests adding a combined effect of length of schooling and a small 
country dummy. We develop various small country dummies with the help 
of the cumulative distribution of GDP in constant international dollars in 
the year 2000. We divide countries according to the five quantiles of this 
distribution, enabling us to define four different size dummies, according 
to the thresholds. We start out using the smallest threshold, i.e. we add a 
size dummy that is positive for those countries in the lowest quantile of  
the cumulative distribution of GDP in constant international dollars in the 
year 2000, and interact it with the schooling variable, GDP1 × u25j,tT.26 We 
                                                 
26  We already documented some reservation concerning the use of interaction dummies. e 
therefore also tested for size dummies without interaction with schooling. As this did not 
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take this issue up again in the sensitivity test in section 6, where we also 
explore the consequences of controlling for country size directly in terms 
of GDP in constant international dollars. 
Finally, transition may exert an influence on the behaviour of our potential 
technology variables beyond hypothesis (9).27 By the definition of 
transition, this is rather likely to affect the speed of convergence rather 
than the steady state. Accordingly, in a first specification we control for 
transition effects in our testing equation by adding a combined effect of 
transition status and initial variety, Trans × log CGVjt, Trans × log PGVjt, 
or Trans × log IGVjt. Table A4 in the appendix summarises the description 
of all variables used in the regression analysis. 
Specification  
Our steady state variable, i.e., length of schooling, is available only at 
five-year intervals (1995, 2000). This fact alone makes clear that we 
cannot exploit the full yearly 1992–2004 panel of annual variety data.  
In choosing an estimation approach we rely on the experience with 
estimating conditional per capita income convergence. There has been a 
long-running debate in per capita income growth empirics on how to 
exploit the variation available in panel data. If per capita income growth 
depends on the initial level of countries’ technology, omitting this variable 
causes heterogeneity bias: in the absence of measurement error using 
only within-country variation dominates any estimators using also 
between country variation. Without omitted variable bias but in the 
presence of measurement error, and when explanatory variables are more 
time persistent than measurement error, the opposite is true.28 
Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) perform a Monte Carlo study to assess the 
effects of both sources of bias on various estimators used in per capita 
income growth regressions and find that within estimators greatly 
overstate the speed of convergence and bias steady state variable 
estimates towards zero. Estimators that use at least some between 
variation tend to overestimate steady state variable influence and are 
probably closer to the true speed of convergence. Especially, the SUR 
estimator used in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) performs best in terms 
of estimating speed of convergence. The between estimator (OLS applied 
to a single cross-section averaged over time) performs best in terms of 
overall bias. 
With potential mismeasurement in our trade-based variety data, the above 
argument points towards employing a traditional between estimator in our 
context of conditional technological convergence estimation. Our main 
                                                                                                                                            
qualitatively change our results, we prefer GDP1 × u25j,tT., which is more in the spirit of our 
theoretical framework. 
27  See Frensch (2004) for a theoretical justification that improvements in public governance, 
which are connected to a successful political transformation, facilitate variety gains during 
transition.  
28 Provided all our countries are “small” relative to the technology frontier, our approach should 
not suffer from heterogeneity bias (cf. (9) in section 3.2). To make sure, we will in our 
sensitivity analysis construct a smaller sample excluding those countries where this 
assumptions seems in doubt due to their prominence in innovation activity. 
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limitation here is data availability: after data cleaning (see Appendix 2), 
the maximum number of observations over a period somewhat longer 
than five years is around 40. We can increase this by about two thirds by 
using data from two five-year periods (1993–98 and 1999–2004). 
Accordingly, we compromise between data availability and measurement 
bias by using data from two five-year periods and estimating this small 
panel with 3SLS (as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, chapter 12, in the 
context of per capita income convergence), i.e., the two-stage least 
squares version of the SUR method, an estimation technique less prone to 
measurement bias than other panel estimators, and appropriate when 
there may be both heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in 
the residuals.29 
5.3. Estimation and discussion of the results  
We accordingly estimate  
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 (11) 
with available capital goods variety data, and corresponding equations 
with available primary goods variety data, and with  available intermediate 
goods variety data, respectively. A priori expectations from (9) and the 
discussion of control variables in the previous section are that β1, β4, β5 < 
0 and β2, β3 > 0 for the available capital goods estimation.  
Instruments are the one-period lagged initial state variables. (11) is tested 
over an unbalanced panel of countries over two intervals of equal length T 
= 5, 1993–98 and 1999–2004, i.e. as a system of two equations. 
Estimation is by three-state-least squares allowing the error terms to have 
different variances in the two intervals and to be correlated across 
intervals.  
Estimation results are given in Table 1. Coefficients of control variables 
have the expected signs and are significant in the CGV estimation (capital 
goods, Table 1, column 1), with the exception of the size variable. This is 
different in the PGV and IGV estimations (primary goods, Table 1, column 
2, and intermediate goods, Table 1, column 3, respectively). Especially, 
transition does not have a significant effect on PGV or IGV growth. 
– Table 1 about here – 
More importantly in the sense of our conditional technological convergence 
hypothesis,  estimations also reveal important differences with respect to 
the significance of schooling and the estimated speed of convergence. For 
                                                 
29  In the per capita income convergence literature close to our approach measurement bias of 
initial states is also dealt with by using lagged initial state variables as instruments, usually 
lagged for the length of one period, i.e. five years in our context. Our data, however, start 
only with 1992 and thus allow only for a one year lag. Using this lagged state variable as 
instrument results in our system being just identified, so we cannot properly test for the 
validity of these instruments, e.g. with a Sargan test. 
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their full sample of countries, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Table 12.3, 
p. 522), report a conditional convergence speed of real per capita GDP of 
2.5 per cent. In addition, Wong’s (2007) recent findings indicate that tfp 
growth, rather than capital accumulation, is what empirically accounts for 
conditional income convergence both for richer and poorer countries. 
Thus, conditional technological convergence speeds much different from 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s 2.5 per cent would appear counterfactual. 
Indicating estimated speeds of convergence of 2.1 and 2.9 per cent, 
respectively, CGV and PGV results in Table 1 match Barro and Sala-i-
Martin’s. The speed of convergence from the intermediate goods variety 
regressions of 4.4 per cent seems too high to be consistent with 
conditional technological convergence in the context outlined above.  
Average length of schooling of the labour-force-aged population exerts a 
significant effect only on the growth of available variety of capital goods, 
but not so on the growth of available variety of primary or intermediate 
goods. As is to be expected from the hypothesis (9), the effect of 
schooling on variety growth is rather small: increasing length of schooling 
by one year increases the yearly average growth rate of the variety of 
available capital goods by about 0.0014, i.e. when expressing growth 
rates in percentages, this amounts to slightly less than one seventh of a 
percentage point. Equivalently, ceteris paribus it takes an increase of 
about three and a half years in the average length of schooling to bring 
about a half a percentage point increase in the yearly average growth rate 
of the variety of available capital goods. 
The first evidence thus seems to point towards the direction that a trade-
based count measure of the variety of available capital goods in our 
expanded product space, allowing for product differentiation by country of 
origin, indeed behaves “as if” it represented technology in the sense of 
hypothesis (9), while measures of the variety of primary or intermediate 
goods do not. This is perfectly in line with the spirit of capital-goods-
variety-based growth models: the division of labour can be expected to be 
embedded in the variety of available capital goods, much more so than in 
the variety of primary or intermediate goods. 
Policy reforms in transition 
So far, we have not specified how exactly transition exerts an influence on 
the speed of technological convergence. Within our approach, studying 
this in more detail means searching for a policy reform area that has a 
positive impact on technology over and above that on trade. The variables 
most in use for such a purpose are the EBRD transition indicators, 
measured on a scale between levels 1 and 4+ (= 4.33). I.e., these 
variables are ordered qualitative rather than cardinal measures and should 
perhaps best not be used directly in linear regression analysis. Rather, we 
construct dummy variables from these EBRD indicators in the general form 
of ReformMeasure_Levelj,tT, indicating whether or not a country has within 
a certain policy field made the step towards a certain level on the EBRD 
scale within a given period. We define seven reform fields (price 
liberalisation, foreign trade and payments liberalisation, de jure large scale 
privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, banking reform 
and interest rate liberalisation, securities markets and non-bank financial 
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institutions reform, and progress with competition policy), in each of which 
four steps can possibly be taken on the EBRD scale. This makes for twenty 
eight potential indicators of the general form of ReformMeasure_Levelj,tT 
(Table A4).30 
From Aghion et al. (2005) one might expect that banking reform has a 
positive impact on technical change over and above that on trade, while 
there is no clear cut a priori expectation on the direction of influence of 
other policy reforms. We therefore substitute in (11) our preliminary 
transition control variable Trans×log CGVjt with Bank_2j,tT×log CGVjt, and 
do correspondingly in IGV and PGV estimation equations,  where Bank_2j,tT  
indicates whether or not a country has made the step towards level 2 on 
the EBRD scale in the area of banking reform and interest rate 
liberalisation within a given period.  
Policy reforms may not be exogenous because of potential reverse 
causality from technology via per capita income growth on reforms, or 
because of common effects of omitted variables on both technical change 
and reforms (e.g., the often quoted “distance to Brussels”). However, 
Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) show in a simultaneous equations approach that 
there is no significant endogeneity problem in the per capita growth and 
policy reforms context.  As income growth appears to be the only potential 
channel between technology and reforms, we thus take policy reforms to 
be exogenous for our purposes. 
Results in Table 2 confirm our expectations, in as much as banking 
reforms exert a significant and  positive effect on the speed of CGV 
convergence (column 4, Table 2).  
– Table 2 about here – 
Substituting the transition dummy in the CGV estimation by a specific 
banking reform variable only slightly changes the point estimates of other 
explanatory variables, with the exception of the investment-consumption 
ratio change, which is substantially reduced. The significance of estimated 
coefficients (again, with the exception of the investment-consumption 
ratio change) and the overall fit of the CGV estimation is substantially 
improved (column 4, Table 2 versus column 1, Table 1). 
Surprisingly, the impact of banking reforms during transition is negative 
on the speed of IGV convergence (column 6, Table 2), while the relatively 
high speed of convergence estimate is only slightly reduced, and the effect 
of schooling remains insignificant. The latter also holds for the PGV 
estimation (column 8, Table 2). 
To test for potential misspecification, we applied a systems version of 
Ramsey’s Reset-test in form of a Wald-test on polynomials of second, 
second and third, and second, third and fourth order, respectively, of the 
fitted values from column 4, 6 and 8 regressions in Table 2 in augmented 
                                                 
30  In fact, there are fewer than that. With different reform progress in different fields, we can 
only consider levels on the EBRD scale, which create sufficient variability in the data. E.g., in 
the period under consideration, no transition country has reached “level 4” on the EBRD scale 
in terms of banking reform. Attempts to study the corresponding impact on variety change 
thus make little sense.  
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regressions. In none of these tests could we reject the null of zero 
coefficients of these polynomials for the CGV and PGV regressions. 
However, we had to reject the hypothesis of zero coefficients for the 
second and third order fitted value polynomials at 10 percent level of 
significance for the IGV regression. 
Summing up this evidence, we take Table 2 results as substantiating our 
first impression that our trade-based count measure of the available 
variety of capital goods indeed behaves as if it represented technology, 
while measures of the available variety of primary or intermediate goods 
do not. But how robust and how plausible are these results?  
6 Sensitivity 
Sample composition   
The motivation for the learning process (3) was the existence of 
technology transfer, but this concept is in principle relevant also within, 
not only across countries: the important difference between countries is 
thus not the absence of technology transfer but whether or not countries 
are small relative to the technology frontier, which is what we assumed in 
deriving our conditional technological convergence hypothesis. We 
construct a “small country” sample excluding countries where this 
assumption seems in doubt due to their prominence in innovation activity 
(see fn. 6 in section 3.1), thus reducing potential heterogeneity bias if the 
small country assumption were wrong. Repeating the above discussion of 
results for columns (5), (7), and (9) in Table 2 confirms the conclusion 
that our trade-based count measure of the available variety of capital 
goods behaves as if it represented technology, while measures of the 
available variety of primary or intermediate goods do not. Specifically, 
excluding countries with substantial innovation activity from the CGV 
estimation (column 5, Table 2) results in a slight reduction of the point 
estimate of the speed of convergence and an increase in that of the 
schooling variable, while results in general are quite robust to sample 
composition. 
Definition of intermediate goods 
The so far negative outcome for testing for technological content in 
intermediate goods variety in the sense of our hypothesis (9) may perhaps 
be due to our too strictly following the definition of intermediate goods as 
outlined in Appendix 2. Accordingly, we experimented with alternative 
definitions of intermediate goods in testing the IGV estimations in columns 
(6) and (7) of Table 2.  Specifically, we alternatively defined intermediate 
goods (i) not to contain BEC heading 121, (ii) not to contain BEC heading 
42, (iii) not to contain BEC headings 42 and 53, (iv) to consist only of BEC 
heading 22, (v) to consist only of BEC headings 42 and 53. For none of 
these alternative specifications was there a qualitative change to the 
results in columns (6) and (7) of Table 2.  Specifically, for none of these 
specifications did schooling significantly explain IGV growth, or did 
transitional banking reform significantly increase IGV speed of 
convergence (results are available upon request). 
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Alternative size variables  
In section 4.2, we argued that both the spirit of our model and the 
expected moderate size of fixed costs of new technology adoption suggest 
reflecting country size effects by adding a combined effect of length of 
schooling and a small country dummy. So far, we have used a size dummy 
that is positive for those countries in the lowest of  five quantiles of the 
cumulative distribution of GDP in constant international dollars in the year 
2000, GDP1 × u25j,tT. Table 3 indicates estimation results for our 
benchmark CGV estimation (column 4, Table 2), when widening the 
definition of the size dummies to include an increasing number of the five 
quantiles of the cumulative distribution of GDP in constant international 
dollars in the year 2000, i.e., for GDP2 × u25j,tT, GDP3 × u25j,tT,  and 
GDP4 × u25j,tT. We also explore the consequences of controlling for 
country size directly in terms of GDP in comparable international dollars, in 
(column 13) or without (column 14) combination with the schooling 
variable u25j,tT. CGV results are presented in Table 3 and indicate that 
none of the alternative size variables exerts a significant influence on CGV 
growth. Hence we conclude that fixed costs of technology transfer indeed 
seem to be a problem only for countries of comparatively small size (PGV 
and IGV results are available upon request). 
– Table 3 about here – 
Alternative schooling variables   
As hypothesis (9) is in accordance with Mincerian wage formation, our 
preferred schooling measure is u25j,tT, the average length of schooling of 
the labour-force-aged population. We test the robustness of our 
benchmark results in column 4 of Table 2, both for the full sample and for 
the small country sample, to alternative measures of schooling, where 
u25,2j,tT indicates the percentage share of the labour-force-aged 
population with secondary education; f indicates schooling measures for 
the female part of the population. As Table 4 indicates, all alternative 
schooling measures are significant in CGV estimations across both 
samples, without substantially altering point estimates and significance 
levels of other coefficients. As none of our alternative schooling measures 
turns out significant in our PGV and IGV regressions (available upon 
request), we conclude that our results are robust to the measurement of 
educational attainment. 
– Table 4 about here – 
In addition, Table 4 reveals two interesting patterns: (1) secondary 
schooling measures are cet. par. more significant in CGV estimations than 
length of schooling measures. (2) Schooling measures for the female part 
of the population are cet. par. more significant in CGV estimations than for 
the total population. As an suggested answer to the second regularity, 
provided that females have so far been disadvantaged in education in 
most countries, their change signals change in both mean and variance of 
total population educational attainment, both of which are conducive to 
improving a learning processes such as (3). I.e., female schooling 
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measures are in fact preferable to total population measures. All these 
results are also robust to substituting education parameters for age 25 to 
65 by education parameters for age 15 to 65 (available upon request).   
Alternative policy reforms in transition in CGV estimations  
We have already indicated that – except for banking reform – we 
constructed a number of additional transition reform measures in the 
general form of ReformMeasure_Levelj,tT, indicating whether or not a 
country has within a certain policy field made the step towards a certain 
level on the EBRD scale within a given period (for details see Table A4). 
Only four of these turned out significant when being substituted for 
Bank_2j,tT, i.e. for whether or not a country has made the step towards 
level 2 on the EBRD scale in the area of banking reform and interest rate 
liberalisation within a given period, in the CGV benchmark estimation 
(column 4, Table 2). These reform indicators are presented in Table 5, 
they are PL_4j,tT  (for the step towards level 4 price liberalisation in the 
EBRD scale); FT_4j,tT (level 4 in foreign trade and payments liberalisation), 
LSP_2j,tT (level 2 in de jure large scale privatisation); and CP_2j,tT (level 2 
in competition policy).  
– Table 5 about here – 
Of these, only the price liberalisation dummy is uncorrelated with the 
banking reform dummy for the benchmark estimation sample, with a 
correlation coefficient of less than 0.1. However, estimation with the price 
liberalisation dummy in Column 21a, Table 5, produces non-normal 
second subperiod residuals; once we remove the responsible data point, 
price liberalisation does no longer significantly influence speed of 
convergence in the CGV estimation (Column 21b, Table 5). Both the 
foreign trade and payments liberalisation and the large scale privatisation 
dummies are highly correlated with the banking reform dummy for the 
benchmark estimation sample, with correlation coefficients of 0.8. I.e. 
these reforms tend to be taken at the same time with banking reform. 
However, as in Aghion et al. (2005) we do have a theoretical basis for 
including the banking reform dummy, but do not have such a basis for 
including the foreign trade and payments liberalisation and the large scale 
privatisation dummies, and as respective CGV estimations in columns 22 
and 23 typically deteriorate the overall fit of the CGV estimation, we prefer 
not to substitute any of these two reform measures for the banking reform 
measure in the CGV benchmark estimation. With respect to these criteria, 
the preference for the banking reform dummy versus a competition reform 
dummy also holds, albeit less clearly so: the correlation between banking 
reform and competition policy improvement is moderate, with a simple 
correlation coefficient of 0.47; column 24 shows that including a however 
theoretically so far unbacked competition reform dummy does not 
deteriorate the overall fit of the CGV estimation, as compared to including 
banking reform.  
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Additional regressors  
A strong case can be made that the Reset test on our benchmark 
specification tests only for functional form misspecification, rather than for 
omitted variables. We therefore also test the influence of additional 
variables, summed up in µ, potentially influencing the learning process 
(3), namely the mid-period levels of population density and the share of 
urban population, and the mid-period logs of the sum of residents’ and 
non-residents’ patent applications and the sum of residents’ and non-
residents’ patent applications per employee, respectively, all drawn from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2006. None of these 
additional regressors turned out significant in the CGV benchmark 
estimation (column 4, Table 2). Again, results are available upon request. 
7 Plausibility of the results 
Our results are structural test results, i.e., they are based on a clearly 
spelled-out hypothesis. As indicated in section 3.1, Jones’ (2002) learning 
process (3), and thus our hypothesis (9), are in full consistence with 
Mincerian wage formation. This indeed gives us a chance to check the 
plausibility of our estimations against other, independent results. 
Comparing our CGV equation (11) to the hypothesis (9) reveals our 
estimated coefficients in the CGV estimations to be restricted as β1 = –γg, 
and β2 = ψg. Thus, the ratio of our –β2/ β1 estimates is an imputed macro-
based estimate of a Mincer coefficient of average returns to schooling in 
our sample, indicating the percentage real wage rise, ψ/γ, implied by each 
year of additional schooling. In addition, we may check the plausibility of 
our β1 estimate against what we know about g, the rate of change of the 
world technology frontier, given our parameter restriction, 0 < γ ≤ 1 in 
(3).  
Pritchett (2006, p. 657) informs about Mincer coefficients based on 
estimates of wage regressions: “The central tendency of the coefficient on 
schooling in a log wage/earnings regression is between 7 percent (the 
average for the OECD countries) and 10 percent (the average for the non-
OECD countries) ... The median in the whole sample is 8.5 percent and 
the standard deviation is 3.4 percentage points.” Also, Bils and Klenow 
(2000) report returns to schooling of 10 percent on average for a 52 
country sample. However, for the only 17 countries, for which our and the 
Bils and Klenow (2000) samples overlap, we compute a considerably lower 
average figure around 6 per cent, as our sample excludes very poor 
developing countries with above-average returns to schooling. As, also 
according to Pritchett (2006), there is little substance for or against 
significant differences between social and private rates of return to 
education, our imputed macro-based Mincer coefficients, as the ratio of –
β2/ β1 estimates, should indeed be consistent with the figures quoted.  
With the ratio of –β2/ β1 estimates between 0.06 (in our CGV benchmark 
estimation (column 4, Table 2) and 0.07 (column 15, Table 4a), the order 
of magnitude of our point estimates seems plausible. Also, consistent with 
results reported in Bils and Klenow (2000) and Pritchett (2006), our 
imputed macro-based Mincer coefficient goes up to between 0.08 (column 
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5, Table 2) and 0.09 (column 18, Table 4b), when banning the most 
innovative – and richest – economies from the sample. 
The parameter restriction 0 < γ ≤ 1 in (3) implies our estimated β1 as 0 < 
–β1 ≤ g, where g is the rate of change of the world technology frontier. On 
this, we have little independent information. However, a rough first 
approximation might be technical progress in the U.S. economy, arguably 
one of the world’s technological leaders. As over the long-run, the U.S. 
economy can be assumed to be on its steady-state growth path, technical 
progress here should equal the growth rate of labour productivity. In per 
capita terms, this has been around 2 per cent over the 20th century 
(Kehoe and Prescott, 2002), where, however, one might well argue in 
favour of a higher figure, given that our data cover 1992–2004, i.e., a 
period when the productivity growth slump of the post 1973 era had been 
overcome.31 If this is correct, this independent source of information, 
together with the parameter restriction on γ, implies an estimated  –β1 
between 0 and about 2.5–3 to be plausible. Our benchmark point 
estimates, –0.023 and – 0.021 for the full sample and the small country 
sample, respectively (columns 4, 5, Table 2), meet this requirement well, 
and in turn indicate that γ may be closer to 1 than to 0, underlining the 
importance of the original technology gap in the learning process (3): the 
elasticity of the transitory growth rate of h with respect to the original 
technology gap is certainly closer to one than to zero. 
Thus, with appropriate caution, our results indicate that not only the 
estimated speed of technological convergence matches that of income 
convergence, but also that our estimates are plausible when checked 
against independent information from Mincerian wage regressions and 
what we know about the rate of change of the world technology frontier.  
8 Conclusions  
The results of this paper constitute evidence on the issue of direct 
measurement of the state of  technology by trade-based measures of 
product variety. A trade-based count measure of the variety of available 
capital goods, defined over an expanded product space allowing for 
product differentiation by country of origin, indeed behaves “as if” it 
represented technology when change of technology is understood as 
Jones’ (2002) learning process. Variety measures of available primary and 
intermediate inputs do not behave this way. Based on available capital 
goods variety estimations, there is conditional technological convergence 
among a panel of mostly OECD and transition countries, where the speed 
of convergence corresponds to that of real per capita income arrived at 
with comparable estimation techniques. Extending the analysis to allow for 
transitional reforms to influence technological convergence shows that 
banking reforms exert a positive an significant effect on the speed of 
technological convergence. 
Against the background of the recent use of various trade-based variety 
measures as if implicitly representing states of technology, our results 
                                                 
31  Bureau of Labor Statistics data, as reproduced in Jones (2002, p. 46) indicate a trend growth rate of 
output per hour worked between 2.5 per cent for 1949–98, and 3.3 per cent for 1949–73. 
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imply that caution is needed when constructing such measures: measures 
that include information on the variety of consumption, primary, or 
intermediate goods and/or only on export variety rather than available 
variety seem unwarranted when testing variety-productivity links rooted in 
capital-goods-variety-based models of growth.. 
There is much scope for further research. Both theoretically as well as 
empirically, an integration of trade-based variety and quality measures to 
better proxy the extent and the quality of the division of labour as a 
measure of technology is called for. Finally, if available intermediate goods 
variety is not a technology variable, what then is it? Increases in the 
variety of intermediate goods available for production may have 
productivity effects, while the results of this paper would imply that these 
effects are not based on technology characteristics in the sense of the 
theoretical basis of the paper. What exactly then would be the channel for 
productivity effects of an increased variety of intermediate goods available 
for production remains unclear.  
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Appendix 1: A closed-form solution for h(t) 
Technical change is as described in (4). Define the technology of a country 
relative to the frontier as ),(/)()( tAthtB =  and the respective growth rate 
as .)()()( tAthtB δδδ −=  Assume the technological frontier grows according to 
gteAtA 0)( = , and g  is given to any single country in the world such that 
.)()( gthtB −= δδ  Then, (4) can be rewritten as 
γψµδ −=+ )()( tBeg utB  
or equivalently as 
gtBe
tB
tB u −= −γψµ )(
)(
)(&
 
and 
 )()()( 1 tgBtBetB u −= −γψµ&  (A1) 
(A1) is a Bernoulli-equation, which can be transformed into an ordinary 
linear differential equation by setting ,)()( γtBtZ =   and accordingly  
).()()( 1 tBtBtZ && −= γγ   Then, (A1) becomes 
)()( tgZetZ u −= ψµγ
&
 
and thus 
 ).()( tgZetZ u γγµ ψ −=&   (A2) 
(A2) has the explicit solution 
)1()( 0
gtugt ee
g
eZtZ γψγ µ −− −+=  
such that  
 )1()()1()( *00
gtgtgtugt eBeBee
g
eBtB γγγγγψγγγ µ −−−− −+=−+=  (A3) 
The resemblance so far to the derivation of the closed-form solution for 
per capita income in the Solow model (Jones, mimeo) is evident. From 
(A3), we can straightforwardly derive, 
 
gtgtugt eAee
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e
A
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0
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Appendix 2: Trade-based measurement of variety 
For this paper, data were extracted from COMTRADE in November 2005, 
complemented and corrected in a few cases by using COMTRADE-on-line 
in January 2006. 
Commodity classifications 
SITC 
The Standard International Trade Classification, Revision 3 (SITC, Rev.3) 
was used at all aggregation levels (1-, 2- and 3-digit levels for checking 
totals, 4- and 5-digit levels for counting SITC categories). 
There are 3,121 basic headings in the SITC, Rev.3, 2,824 at 
the 5-digit level and 297 at 4-digits, that are not disaggre-
gated any further.  The 3-digit group 334 (petroleum prod-
ucts), which is divided into eight final headings in SITC, Rev.3, 
is in fact not subdivided by many reporting countries, so we 
treat it as a single heading. Thus, there are 3,114 basic head-
ings, which are referred to as SITC categories.  
BEC 
The United Nations Statistics Division’s Classification by BEC (Broad Eco-
nomic Categories, available online at:  
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/family2.asp?Cl=10) allows for headings of 
the SITC, Rev.3 to be grouped into 19 activities covering primary and 
processed foods and beverages, industrial supplies, fuels and lubricants, 
capital goods and transport equipment, and consumer goods according to 
their durability. The BEC also provides for the rearrangement of these 19 
activities (on the basis of SITC categories’ main end-use) to approximate 
the basic System of National Accounts (SNA) activities, namely, primary 
goods, intermediate goods, capital goods, and consumer goods. 
– Table A1 about here – 
Primary goods (BEC headings 111, 21) consist of 272 SITC, 
Rev.3 categories and include primary food and beverages des-
ignated mainly for industrial use and primary industrial sup-
plies (raw materials). 
Intermediate goods (BEC headings 121, 22, 42, 53) consist of 
1,627 SITC, Rev.3 categories and include: processed food and 
beverages designated mainly for industry; processed industrial 
supplies, parts and accessories of capital goods, and transport 
equipment.   
Capital goods (BEC headings 41, 521) comprise 471 categories 
at the 4- and 5-digit levels of the SITC, Rev.3 and include: 
machinery such as electric generators and computers; indus-
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trial transport equipment such as finished ships, road vehicles, 
aircraft, railway and tramway rolling stock; and other manu-
factured goods such as medical furniture, which are used by 
industry, government and non-profit private institutions. 
Consumer goods (BEC headings 112, 122, 522, 6) cover 704 
categories at 4- and 5-digits of the SITC and include primary 
and processed food and beverages designated mainly for 
household consumption, non-industrial transport equipment, 
such as motorcycles and bicycles, and other consumer goods. 
SITC categories falling under BEC headings 51, 3, and 7 are excluded from 
our rearrangement of SITC categories into primary goods, intermediate 
goods, capital goods, and consumer goods for various reasons. “Motor 
vehicles for the transport of passengers”, SITC, Rev.3, heading 7812 
(equivalent to BEC heading 51) cannot be divided into capital or consumer 
goods. Similar reasoning holds for motor spirits. By definition, 
intermediate goods should also include primary and processed fuels and 
lubricants (other than motor spirit), but in this data set “fuels and 
lubricants”, which include 32 4- and 5-digit headings of the SITC, Rev.3, 
are not used, in part due to countries’ incomparable reporting practices 
(see above). BEC 7, “goods not elsewhere classified”, comprises 14 basic 
headings of the SITC, namely, military equipment, including arms and 
ammunitions, special transactions, postal packages, etc., which are 
excluded. 
Country and period coverage 
Reporting countries’ data were extracted for 46 UNECE countries, i.e. most 
of Europe, Central Asia and  North America. Belgium and Luxemburg are 
counted as one country throughout as reported until 1998. The data cover 
1992–2004 but not all countries report in each year (average: 40.15 
countries per year).    
– Table A2 about here – 
Partner countries comprise the rest of the world (for total exports and 
imports), and 55 individual countries (the 46 reporter countries plus: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, China, Hong Kong, Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand) for imports and thus for the product 
variety count. These partner countries generally account for 80–95 per 
cent of reported imports (on average above 90 per cent for the data points 
actually used in regressions (1–24), although Canada and the United 
States trade extensively with south American countries that are not 
included among the 55 partners). Also, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and  
Macedonia are partner countries only from 1993 on, thus slightly 
weakening the strength of our 1992 product variety data, which are used 
as instruments in first subperiod regressions (1) – (24) in Tables 1–5. 
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Data cleaning  
The most important source of measurement bias in our variety data is 
potential fluctuation in data coverage on the fairly disaggregate level of 
SITC we are using, i.e. fluctuations in the ratio of reported exports (or 
imports) of all the individual SITC categories and total exports (or 
imports). Even by eyeballing the data (Table A3), Turkmen, Kazakh and 
Kyrgyz data disqualify in this respect right away. If we were to normalise 
the distributions of these coverage fluctuations for the rest of the data 
over our five-year periods of interest, we would have to forego about ten 
per cent of the data. Rather than doing this, we dismiss the most obvious 
remaining outliers, which are the coverage fluctuations in the Croatian 
data between 1993–98. Consistency checks with the remaining data 
reveal that all Polish product variety measures double between 2003 and 
2004, unaccounted for by any comparable coverage fluctuation but 
probably due to changes in the methodology since the EU accession. As 
the emerging distrust comes on top of an often substantial mismatch 
between Polish customs and balance of payments foreign trade data 
during the 1990s, we also have to dismiss Polish data. Given the above 
procedure, checking for normality of residuals in our estimations is a clear 
must. 
– Table A3 about here – 
 
– Table A4 about here – 
 
– Table A5 about here – 
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Appendix 3: Text tables and figures  
Figure 1: Available variety by BEC groups in Western Europe, North America and the CIS, 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: United Nations COMTRADE database and own calculations. 
Notes: The maximum attainable variety counts are 39,424 for consumer goods, 26,376 for capital goods, and 106,344 for primary and interme-
diate goods together.   
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Table 1: Available product variety growth regressions (3SLS) 
 
    (1) (2) (3) 
 Capital goods Intermedia-
te goods  
Primary 
goods  
 Dependent variables: (log CGVj,t+T – 
log CGVjt)/T 
(log IGVj,t+T 
– log 
IGVjt)/T 
(log PGVj,t+T 
– log 
PGVjt)/T 
Explanatory variables:    
Initial variety relative to consumer 
goods, log CGVjt   
 
 log IGVjt    
 
 log PGVjt 
 
–0.021** 
(–2.00) 
 
 
 
–0.044*** 
(–3.14) 
 
 
 
 
–0.029*** 
(–3.29) 
Average years of schooling, 
 u25j,tT  
0.0014* 
(1.77) 
–0.0001 
(–0.10) 
–0.0006 
(–0.55) 
Size,     
 GDP1 × u25j,tT 
 
–0.0007 
(–1.50) 
–0.0019*** 
(–2.87) 
–0.0023** 
(–2.56) 
Investment-consumption ratio 
change, inv_conj,t+T – 
inv_conjt 
0.090*** 
(4.73) 
0.069*** 
(3.17) 
0.036 
(1.18) 
Transition,    
 Trans× log CGVj t 
 
  Trans× log IGVjt 
 
 Trans× log IGVjt  
 
–0.018** 
(–2.46) 
 
 
0.004 
(0.74) 
 
 
 
 
0.005 
(1.29) 
Observations 
(1993–98, 1999–2004) 
64 (25, 39) 64 (25, 39) 64 (25, 39) 
Correlation between 
subperiod residuals 
0.06 0.23 –0.24 
Adj. R-squared 
(1993–98, 1999–2004) 
0.36, 0.39 0.22, 0.37 –0.15, 0.11 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. * (**, ***): significance at 10, (5, 1) per cent. 
Instruments: one year lagged initial relative product varieties. Interval dummies 
not reported. We cannot reject non-normality of second subperiod residuals in (2) 
and (3) on a Jarque-Bera test at 5 per cent level; qualitative results in (2) and 
(3) are robust to removal of an outlier (YUG) normalising residuals, except for an 
almost 50 per cent decline in the point estimates of the speed of convergence and 
the size coefficient in (2). 
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Table 2: Available product variety growth regressions with banking reform in transition (3SLS) 
    (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Capital goods Intermediate goods Primary goods 
Dependent variables: (log CGVj,t+T – log 
CGVjt)/T 
(log IGVj,t+T – log IGVjt)/T (log PGVj,t+T – log PGVjt)/T 
Explanatory variables: Full 
sample  
Small coun-
try sample 
Full 
sample  
Small 
country 
sample 
Full sample  Small 
country sample 
Initial variety relative to consumer 
goods, log CGVjt   
 
 log IGVjt    
 
 log PGVjt 
–0.023** 
(–2.59) 
–0.021** 
(–2.27) 
 
 
–0.041*** 
(–3.83) 
 
 
–0.042*** 
(–3.96) 
 
 
 
 
–0.025*** 
(–3.26) 
 
 
 
 
–0.032*** 
(–3.28) 
Average years of schooling, 
 u25j,tT  
0.0013* 
(1.99) 
0.0016* 
(2.01) 
–0.0001 
(–0.12) 
–0.0004 
(–0.48) 
–0.0004 
(–0.38) 
–0.0011 
(–0.90) 
Size,     
 GDP1 × u25j,tT 
–0.0009** 
(–2.31) 
–0.0009** 
(–2.05) 
–0.0020*** 
(–3.71) 
–0.0020*** 
(–3.42) 
–0.0024*** 
(–2.85) 
–0.0027*** 
(–2.91) 
Investment-consumption ratio 
change, inv_conj,t+T – 
inv_conjt 
0.075*** 
(4.64) 
0.075*** 
(4.44) 
0.057*** 
(3.18) 
0.060*** 
(3.15) 
–0.006 
(–0.217) 
–0.004* 
(–0.14) 
Banking reform in transition,  
 Bank_2j,tT × log CGVjt 
 
  Bank_2j,tT × log IGVjt 
 
 Bank_2j,tT × log PGVjt 
–0.070*** 
(–5.70) 
–0.070*** 
(–5.54) 
 
 
0.050*** 
(4.77) 
 
 
0.042*** 
(4.84) 
 
 
 
 
–0.008** 
(–2.05) 
 
 
 
 
–0.008* 
(–1.93) 
Observations (1993–98, 1999–2004) 64 (25, 39) 52 (19, 33) 64 (25, 39) 52 (19, 33) 64 (25, 39) 52 (19, 33) 
Correlation between subperiod re-
siduals 
–0.19 –0.21 0.07 0.08 –0.27 –0.18 
Adj. R-squared (1993–98, 1999–
2004) 
0.54, 0.56 0.57, 0.57 0.52, 0.47 0.56, 0.47 –0.43, 0.27 –0.75, 0.29 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. * (**, ***): significance at 10, (5, 1) per cent. Instruments: one year lagged initial relative product varieties. Interval 
dummies not reported. The small country sample excludes observations from the six G-7 economies in our sample, i.e. the US, the UK, France, 
Germany, Italy and Canada (cf. fn. 6 in the text). We cannot reject non-normality of second subperiod residuals in (6–9) on a Jarque-Bera test at 5 per 
cent level; qualitative results in (6–9) are robust to removal of an outlier (YUG) normalising residuals, except for an almost 50 per cent decline in the 
point estimates of the speed of convergence and the size coefficient in (6 and 7). 
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Table 3: Available capital goods variety growth regressions with banking reform in transition (3SLS): 
alternative size variables 
 
    (4) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Dependent variable: (log CGVj,t+T – log CGVjt)/T 
Explanatory variables:       
Initial variety relative to consumer 
goods, log CGVjt    
–0.023** 
(–2.59) 
–0.012 
(–1.38) 
–0.015* 
(–1.80) 
–0.014* 
(–1.68) 
–0.011 
(–1.30) 
–0.014 
(–1.59) 
Average years of schooling, 
 u25j,tT  
0.0013* 
(1.99) 
0.0016** 
(2.36) 
0.0018*** 
(2.68) 
0.0017** 
(2.53) 
–0.0006 
(–0.29) 
0.0012* 
(1.84) 
Size,     
 GDP1 × u25j,tT 
–0.0009** 
(–2.31) 
     
 GDP2 × u25j,tT  –0.00002 
(–0.08) 
    
 GDP3 × u25j,tT   –0.0004 
(–1.58) 
   
 GDP4 × u25j,tT    –0.0002 
(–0.72) 
  
 GDP × u25j,tT     0.0000 
(1.02) 
 
 GDP      0.0010 
(1.49) 
Investment-consumption ratio 
change, inv_conj,t+T – inv_conjt 
0.075*** 
(4.64) 
0.078*** 
(4.56) 
0.085*** 
(5.10) 
0.079*** 
(4.84) 
0.082*** 
(5.13) 
0.084*** 
(5.27) 
Banking reform in transition, 
Bank_2j,tT  × log CGVjt 
–0.070*** 
(–5.70) 
–0.064*** 
(–5.27) 
–0.066*** 
(–5.39) 
–0.065*** 
(–5.31) 
–0.065*** 
(–5.50) 
–0.066*** 
(–5.56) 
Observations (1993–98, 1999–2004) 64 (25, 39) 64 (25, 39) 64 (25, 39) 64 (25, 39) 63 (25, 38) 63 (25, 38) 
Correlation between subperiod 
residuals 
–0.19 –0.16 –0.27 –0.16 –0.22 –0.27 
Adj. R-squared 
(1993–98, 1999–2004) 
0.54, 0.56 0.39, 0.59 0.53, 0.54 0.43, 0.58 0.42, 0.61 0.48, 0.59 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. * (**, ***): significance at 10, (5, 1) per cent. Instruments: one year lagged initial relative product 
varieties. Interval dummies not reported 
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Table 4:  Available capital goods variety growth regressions with banking reform in transition (3SLS): 
alternative schooling measures  
    (4) (15) (16) (17)  (5) (18) (19) (20) 
Dependent variable: (log CGVj,t+T – log CGVjt)/T 
 Full sample  Small country sample 
Explanatory variables:          
Initial variety relative to consumer 
goods, log CGVjt    
–0.023** 
(–2.59) 
–0.021** 
(–2.46) 
–0.020** 
(–2.37) 
–0.018** 
(–2.22) 
 –0.021** 
(–2.27) 
–0.019** 
(–2.11) 
–0.019** 
(–2.08) 
–0.016* 
(–1.90) 
Schooling,   
 u25j,tT  
0.0013* 
(1.99) 
    0.0016* 
(2.01) 
   
 u25fj,tT  0.0014** 
(2.37) 
    0.0017** 
(2.43) 
  
 u25,2j,tT   0.00022** 
(2.41) 
    0.00024** 
(2.39) 
 
 u25,2fj,tT    0.00026**
* 
(3.14) 
    0.00028**
* 
(3.03) 
Size,     
 GDP1 × u25j,tT 
–0.0009** 
(–2.31) 
    –0.0009** 
(–2.05) 
   
 GDP1 × u25fj,tT  –0.0010** 
(–2.30) 
    –0.0009** 
(–2.05) 
  
 GDP1 × u25,2j,tT   –
0.00016** 
(–2.04) 
    –0.00015* 
(–1.73) 
 
 GDP1 × u25,2fj,tT    –
0.00017** 
(–2.10) 
    –0.00015* 
(–1.81) 
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Table 4 contd 
 
    (4) (15) (16) (17)  (5) (18) (19) (20) 
Dependent variable: (log CGVj,t+T – log CGVjt)/T 
 Full sample  Small country sample 
Explanatory variables:          
Investment-consumption ratio 
change, 
inv_conj,t+T – inv_conjt 
0.075*** 
(4.64) 
0.072*** 
(4.50) 
0.076*** 
(4.79) 
0.070*** 
(4.50) 
 0.075*** 
(4.44) 
0.071*** 
(4.23) 
0.078*** 
(4.69) 
0.071*** 
(4.34) 
Banking reform in transition, 
Bank_2j,tT  × log CGVjt 
–0.070*** 
(–5.70) 
–0.070*** 
(–5.82) 
–0.067*** 
(–5.57) 
–0.067*** 
(–5.80) 
 –0.070*** 
(–5.54) 
–0.070*** 
(–5.70) 
–0.067*** 
(–5.40) 
–0.067*** 
(–5.64) 
Observations (1993–98, 1999–2004) 64 (25, 39) 64 (25, 39) 64 (25, 39) 64 (25, 39)  52 (19, 33) 52 (19, 33) 52 (19, 33) 52 (19, 
33) 
Correlation between subperiod 
residuals 
–0.19 –0.20 –0.16 –0.20  –0.21 –0.23 –0.21 –0.26 
Adj. R-squared 
(1993–98, 1999–2004) 
0.54, 
0.56 
0.55, 
0.56 
0.46, 
0.60 
0.48, 
0.63 
 0.57, 0.57 0.58, 0.59 0.53, 0.60 0.53, 
0.63 
 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. * (**, ***): significance at 10, (5, 1) per cent. Instruments: one year lagged initial relative product 
varieties. Interval dummies not reported. The small country sample excludes observations from the six G-7 economies in our sample, i.e. 
the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Canada (cf. fn. 6 in the text). 
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Table 5: Available capital goods variety growth regressions (3SLS): alternative transitional reforms  
    (4) (21a) (21b) (22a) (22b) (23) (24) 
Dependent variable: (log CGVj,t+T – log CGVjt)/T 
Explanatory variables:        
Initial variety relative to consumer 
goods, log CGVjt    
–0.023** 
(–2.59) 
–0.018* 
(–1.71) 
–0.015 
(–1.63) 
–0.023** 
(–2.25) 
–0.020** 
(–2.24) 
–0.016 
(–1.64) 
–0.024*** 
(–2.69) 
Average years of schooling, 
 u25j,tT  
0.0013* 
(1.99) 
0.0014* 
(1.79) 
0.0016** 
(2.19) 
0.0012 
(1.52) 
0.0014** 
(2.03) 
0.0014* 
(1.92) 
0.0014** 
(2.12) 
Size,    
GDP1 × u25j,tT 
–0.0009** 
(–2.31) 
–0.0006 
(–1.23) 
–0.0008* 
(–1.96) 
–0.0006 
(–1.31) 
–0.0009** 
(–2.19) 
–0.0005* 
(–1.22) 
–
0.0012*** 
(–2.77) 
Investment-consumption ratio 
change,  
inv_conj,t+T – inv_conjt 
0.075*** 
(4.64) 
0.094*** 
(4.94) 
0.097*** 
(5.83) 
0.112*** 
(6.26) 
0.109*** 
(7.04) 
0.107*** 
(6.55) 
0.107*** 
(6.95) 
Banking reform in transi-
tion,Bank_2j,tT  × log CGVjt 
–0.070*** 
(–5.70) 
      
Price liberalisation, 
PL_4j,tT  × log CGVjt 
 –0.017** 
(–2.08) 
–0.009 
(–1.24) 
    
Foreign trade and payments lib. 
FT_4j,tT  × log CGVjt 
   –0.080*** 
(–2.70) 
–0.076*** 
(–2.73) 
  
Large scale privatisation, 
LSP_2j,tT  × log CGVjt 
     –0.046*** 
(–3.86) 
 
Competition policy, 
CP_2j,tT  × log CGVjt 
      –0.066*** 
(–5.13) 
Observations 
(1993–98, 1999–2004) 
64 (25, 
39) 
64 (25, 
39) 
63 (25, 
38) 
64 (25, 
39) 
63 (25, 
38) 
64 (25, 
39) 
64 (25, 
39) 
Correlation between subperiod 
residuals 
–0.19 0.01 –0.05 –0.08 –0.13 –0.19 –0.08 
Adj. R-squared 
(1993–98, 1999–2004) 
0.54, 
0.56 
0.36, 
0.38 
0.38, 
0.46 
0.51, 
0.31 
0.55, 
0.42 
0.21, 
0.53 
0.57, 
0.50 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. * (**, ***): significance at 10, (5, 1) per cent. Instruments: one year lagged initial relative product 
varieties. Interval dummies not reported. We cannot reject non-normality of second subperiod residuals in (21a, 22a) on a Jarque-Bera 
test at 5 per cent level. Removal of an outlier (YUG) normalises residuals, resulting in (21b, 22b). 
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Appendix 4: Appendix tables  
Table A1: The structure of BEC  
1 Food and beverages 
11 Primary 
111 Mainly for industry 
112 Mainly for household 
consumption 
12 Processed 
121 Mainly for industry 
122 Mainly for household 
consumption 
2 Industrial supplies not 
elsewhere specified 
21 Primary 
22 Processed 
3 Fuels and lubricants 
31 Primary 
32 Processed 
321 Motor spirit 
322 Other 
4 Capital goods (except 
transport equipment), and 
parts and accessories 
thereof 
41 Capital goods (except 
transport equipment) 
42  Parts and accessories 
5 Transport equipment and 
parts and accessories 
thereof 
51  Passenger motor cars 
52  Other 
521 Industrial 
522 Non-industrial 
53  Parts and accessories 
6 Consumer goods not else-
where specified 
61 Durable 
62 Semi-durable 
63 Non-durable 
7  Goods not elsewhere speci-
fied 
Source: Available online at : 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/family2.asp?Cl=10  
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Table A2: Reporter countries and country codes  
1 ALB Albania 1
7 
GBR United Kingdom 3
3 
NLD Netherlands 
2 ARM Armenia 1
8 
GEO Georgia 3
4 
NOR Norway 
3 AUT Austria 1
9 
GER Germany 3
5 
POL Poland 
4 AZE Azerbaijan 2
0 
GRC Greece 3
6 
PRT Portugal 
5 BEL Belgium and 
Luxemburg 
2
1 
HRV Croatia 3
7 
ROM Romania 
6 BGR Bulgaria 2
2 
HUN Hungary 3
8 
RUS Russia 
7 BLR Belarus 2
3 
IRL Ireland 3
9 
SVK Slovakia 
8 CAN Canada 2
4 
ISL Iceland 4
0 
SVN Slovenia 
9 CHE Switzerland 2
5 
ITA Italy 4
1 
SWE Sweden 
10 CYP Cyprus 2
6 
KAZ Kazakhstan 4
2 
TKM Turkmenistan 
11 CZE Czech Re-
public 
2
7 
KGZ Kyrgyzstan 4
3 
TUR Turkey 
12 DNK Denmark 2
8 
LTU Lithuania 4
4 
UKR Ukraine 
13 ESP Spain 2
9 
LVA Latvia 4
5 
USA United States 
14 EST Estonia 3
0 
MDA Moldova 4
6 
YUG Serbia and 
Montenegro 
15 FIN Finland 3
1 
MKD Macedonia    
16 FRA France 3
2 
MLT Malta    
Notes: Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as one country. OECD countries as of 1992 
underlined. Transition countries in italics.  
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Table A3: Ratio of reported exports (imports) of 3,121 basic headings to total exports (imports) 
    Exports         Imports 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
ALB     1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
1.0
00 
     0.9
98 
0.9
92 
0.9
90 
0.9
94 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
ARM      1.0
00 
 1.0
00 
0.97
0 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
      0.9
99 
 0.9
96 
0.9
99 
 0.9
98 
0.9
96 
0.9
98 
AUT 0.9
90 
0.9
91 
1.0
00 
0.93
5 
0.95
4 
0.93
2 
0.93
7 
0.94
9 
0.95
1 
0.95
3 
0.95
0 
0.95
7 
0.95
8 
 0.97
5 
0.97
5 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
97 
0.9
96 
0.9
92 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
93 
0.9
93 
0.9
91 
AZE     0.9
99 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
92 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
1.0
00 
     0.9
97 
0.9
99 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
BEL 0.98
0 
0.97
9 
0.97
9 
1.0
00 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.95
4 
0.96
1 
0.96
5 
0.96
9 
0.96
7 
0.97
3 
0.97
5 
 0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
97 
1.0
00 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
92 
0.9
91 
0.98
8 
0.9
94 
0.98
6 
0.98
4 
0.98
2 
BGR     0.9
95 
0.9
96 
0.96
9 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
     0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.97
7 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.9
90 
BLR       0.9
92 
0.9
95 
0.9
96 
0.9
94 
0.96
6 
0.96
7 
0.97
1 
       0.9
95 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.93
5 
0.94
5 
0.95
1 
CAN 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.98
8 
0.99
0 
0.98
9 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
CHE 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.98
1 
0.98
7 
0.98
6 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.98
8 
0.98
8 
0.9
92 
CYP 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
CZE  1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.98
5 
0.98
8 
0.9
90 
0.9
91 
0.9
92 
0.9
92 
0.9
91 
0.9
91 
0.99
0 
  1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.9
93 
DNK 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
ESP 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.9
93 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
EST    0.96
8 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
0.9
97 
0.9
99 
    0.9
91 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
97 
0.9
94 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
FIN 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.94
4 
0.94
6 
0.94
4 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
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Table A3 contd.:  
    Exports         Imports 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
FRA 0.98
2 
0.9
99 
0.97
4 
0.97
3 
0.9
93 
0.97
3 
0.97
4 
0.97
7 
0.97
7 
0.97
8 
0.97
4 
0.97
4 
0.97
4 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
92 
0.9
93 
0.9
93 
GBR 0.95
3 
0.97
4 
0.97
9 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.97
9 
0.97
9 
0.9
98 
0.94
1 
0.92
9 
0.94
9 
0.94
4 
0.9
96 
 0.97
8 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.9
99 
0.96
1 
0.93
6 
0.95
3 
0.95
7 
0.9
94 
GEO     1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
     1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
GER 0.9
91 
0.9
91 
0.98
9 
0.98
9 
0.98
8 
0.98
8 
0.98
9 
0.9
92 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.98
8 
0.98
9 
0.99
0 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
94 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
GRC 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
95 
0.9
96 
0.9
95 
0.9
92 
0.9
90 
0.9
90 
0.9
94 
0.98
5 
0.9
90 
0.9
94 
HRV 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
 0.93
7 
0.93
0 
0.91
8 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
97 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.9
93 
HUN 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
96 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.98
9 
IRL 0.9
96 
0.9
93 
0.9
94 
0.9
90 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
91 
0.98
9 
0.9
96 
 0.9
94 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
97 
0.9
95 
ISL 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
ITA 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.98
1 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
97 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.97
5 
KAZ    0.6
47 
0.6
77 
0.6
88 
0.7
08 
0.7
39 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
 0.9
99 
0.7
86 
    0.4
26 
0.4
23 
0.4
35 
0.4
40 
0.4
01 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
 0.9
95 
0.3
99 
KGZ    1.0
00 
1.0
00 
 0.3
49 
0.7
93 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
    1.0
00 
1.0
00 
 0.3
99 
0.4
03 
0.9
97 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
93 
0.9
93 
LTU   1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
96 
0.9
99 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
93 
   1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
95 
0.9
98 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.98
9 
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Table A3 contd.:  
    Exports         Imports 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
LVA   1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
97 
0.9
95 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
94 
   0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
97 
0.9
95 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
97 
0.9
94 
0.9
95 
0.9
94 
MDA    1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
93 
0.9
93 
    1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
95 
MKD   1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
   1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
93 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.9
95 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
94 
0.9
93 
0.9
91 
MLT 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
1.0
00 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
97 
0.9
95 
0.9
91 
0.98
6 
NLD 0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
95 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
 0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
NOR 0.97
7 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.9
95 
 0.9
98 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
POL 0.97
8 
0.98
3 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
93 
0.9
94 
0.9
97 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
96 
 0.97
8 
0.98
5 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
95 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
92 
0.9
92 
0.9
91 
PRT 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
96 
0.9
94 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.9
92 
ROM 0.9
96 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.98
1 
0.98
8 
0.9
95 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
96 
 0.9
99 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
RUS     1.0
00 
0.9
93 
0.9
95 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
95 
     1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
SVK   1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
96 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
96 
   1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
0.9
96 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
92 
0.9
92 
0.9
91 
SVN 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
 1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.98
9 
0.99
0 
0.98
9 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
 1.0
00 
0.9
93 
0.9
94 
0.9
93 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.9
94 
0.99
0 
0.99
0 
0.99
0 
SWE 0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.98
4 
0.98
6 
0.98
7 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
97 
0.9
98 
0.9
96 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
TKM      0.98
1 
0.98
3 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
          0.4
05 
0.3
76 
0.98
9 
0.98
1 
    
TUR 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.97
8 
0.98
2 
0.98
3 
0.9
92 
0.98
1 
0.98
6 
0.98
2 
0.98
1 
0.98
2 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.98
9 
0.97
3 
0.97
6 
0.99
7 
0.96
1 
0.94
3 
0.95
7 
0.95
0 
0.95
9 
  
UKR     1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.97
7 
0.97
6 
       1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
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Table A3 contd.:  
    Exports         Imports 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
USA 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
99 
0.9
95 
0.9
94 
0.9
95 
 1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
98 
0.9
99 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
0.9
95 
YUG 1.0
00 
   1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.97
1 
0.97
9 
0.97
3 
0.97
6 
 0.9
95 
 1.0
00 
   1.0
00 
1.0
00 
1.0
00 
0.9
92 
0.93
2 
0.92
9 
0.93
9 
 0.98
7 
Reporters  
28 
28 31 36 43 44 45 46 46 44 44 43 44  28 28 31 36 43 44 45 46 46 44 44 42 43 
Notes: above 0.99, bold; below 0.90, grey; no data,  data.   
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Table A4: Variables used in regressions (1) – (24), Tables 1–5 
Variable Definition Source Description  and availability 
Dependent variables 
(log CGVj,t+T  – log 
CGVjt)/T,   
(log IGVj,t+T  – log 
IGVjt)/T,  
and  
 
(log PGVj,t+T  – log 
PGVjt)/T  
Average yearly growth rates of 
available variety in capital, in-
termediate, and primary goods; 
relative to available consumer 
goods variety, respectively 
see Text and Appendix 2 
Explanatory variables derived from hypothesis (9) 
log CGVjt , log IGVjt , 
 
and log PGVjt 
Initial available variety in capital, 
intermediate, and primary  
goods; relative to available con-
sumer goods variety, respec-
tively 
see Text and Appendix 2 
u25, u25f 
 
 
u25,2, u25,2f 
 
Average years of school of total 
and female population aged be-
tween 25 and 65, respectively 
Percentage shares of total and 
female population aged between 
25 and 65 with secondary educa-
tion, respectively 
Barro and 
Lee 
(2000)  
Data for ARM, AZE, BLR, GEO, RUS and UKR are still for Soviet Un-
ion. MKD data are proxied by YUG.  
For EST, MKD, LAT, LIT, MDA, YUG, 1990 data must be used to 
proxy year 2000 observations. Due to other data limitations, all of 
these countries, however, enter regressions only with observations 
on the second five-year period (1998–2004). I.e., each educa-
tional attainment observation is indeed used only once for each 
country. 
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Table A4 contd. 
Variable Definition Source Description  and availability 
popdens, urban, pat-
ent applications, pat-
ent applications per 
employee 
Mid-period levels of population 
density and share of urban popu-
lation; mid-period logs of the 
sum of residents’ and non-
residents’ patent applications 
(per employee) 
WDI 
2006  
Additional steady state regressors for sensitivity tests 
Control variables 
inv_conj,t+T – inv_conjt Change in investment-
consumption ratio  
Calcula-
ted from 
WDI 
2006  
data 
Controls for specific demand effects on different BEC groups 
GDP GDP in constant international 
dollars  
WDI 
2006  
 
GDP1,GDP2,GDP3, 
GDP4  
 
 
Country size dummies  Own 
defini-
tion, cal-
culated 
from WDI 
2006 
data 
GDP1 is 1 for the lowest quantile of the cumulative distribution of 
GDP in constant international dollars in the year 2000, GDP2 is 1 for 
the two lowest quantiles of that distribution, etc. 
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Table A4 contd. 
Control variables 
Trans Country dummy to control for 
transition effects 
See Table A2 
PL_4, T_FT_4, LSP_2, 
CP_2, and Bank_2 
Policy reform dummies in transi-
tion economies, where PL: price 
liberalisation, FT: foreign trade 
and payments liberalisation, CP: 
competition policy, and Bank: 
Banking reform and interest rate 
liberalisation 
EBRD EBRD transition indicators are measured on a scale between 1 and 4+ 
(=4.33). According to the EBRD, 1 represents no or little progress; 2 indi-
cates important progress; 3 is substantial progress; 4 indicates compre-
hensive progress, while 4+ indicates countries have reached the stan-
dards and performance norms of advanced industrial countries. Accord-
ingly, the competition policy of all non-transition countries in the sample 
is evaluated at 4+. 
Dummy variables from the EBRD measures indicate whether or not a 
country has made the step towards a certain level in the EBRD scale on 
the respective policy area within a given period. 
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Table A5: List of countries in regression samples in Tables 1–5 
Full sample  Small country sample  
1993–97 1998–2004 1993–97 1998–2004 
 ALB  ALB 
AUT AUT AUT AUT 
 AZE  AZE 
BEL BEL BEL BEL 
 BGR  BGR 
 BLR  BLR 
CAN CAN CAN CAN 
CHE CHE CHE CHE 
CYP  CYP  
 CZE  CZE 
DNK DNK DNK DNK 
ESP ESP ESP ESP 
 EST  EST 
FIN FIN FIN FIN 
FRA FRA   
GBR GBR   
 GEO  GEO 
GER GER   
GRC GRC GRC GRC 
 HRV  HRV 
HUN HUN HUN HUN 
IRL IRL IRL IRL 
ISL ISL ISL ISL 
ITA ITA ITA ITA 
 LTU  LTU 
 LVA  LVA 
 MDA  MDA 
 MKD  MKD 
MLT MLT MLT MLT 
NLD NLD NLD NLD 
NOR NOR NOR NOR 
PRT PRT PRT PRT 
ROM ROM ROM ROM 
 RUS  RUS 
 SVK  SVK 
SVN SVN SVN SVN 
SWE SWE SWE SWE 
TUR TUR TUR TUR 
USA USA   
 YUG  YUG 
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Arbeitspapier Nr. 22 Jörg Maier (Hrsg.) 
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tung von Vertrauen beim Aufbau marktwirt-
schaftlicher Strukturen in Osteuropa 
Mai 2004 
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